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ARTICLES
IRAQ'S CRIMES OF STATE AGAINST
INDIVIDUALS, AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND A WAY FORWARD
Dr. William F. Pepper*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of and subsequent ejec-
tion from Kuwait, significant issues and challenges inevitably
confront both international law and the municipal law of the na-
tions involved. Serious questions arise about the capacity of the
existing structure, policies and procedures of either legal system
to adequately respond to the enormity of the destruction result-
ing from the events of the Gulf War. Primary attention thus far
has been focused on the physical reconstruction of Kuwait itself
and the environmental rehabilitation of the Persian Gulf and
the region. There is, however, also massive personal damage and
human misery that will result in a legion of other claims which
will stretch existing legal institutions, policies and procedures to
their limits. The range of injury and loss visited upon the unfor-
tunate individuals who did not leave Kuwait and the unfortu-
nate residents of Kurdistan clearly constitutes criminal offenses.
Yet it is conceivable, in the absence of an international criminal
court, that the only avenue of redress for monetary compensa-
tion for these victims is the possibility of their commencing civil
proceedings before applicable municipal courts, unless the acts
are also crimes under the relevant national law with provisions
* Barrister, Lincoln's Inn, England, Attorney and Counsellor at Law. B.A. 1959, Co-
lumbia College; M.A. 1960, Columbia University; Certificate 1961, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, University of London, England; Ed.D. 1973, University of
Massachusetts; J.D. cum laude, 1975, Boston College.
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for compensation for victims.
Despite the fact that comparable injury and loss of life
often result from criminal acts and civil tortious behavior, there
is, particularly in common law jurisdictions, a traditional separa-
tion between civil and criminal proceedings. In some previous
instances, however, (notably after World Wars I and II) mone-
tary reparations similar to those apparently envisioned by
United Nations Resolution 6741 were awarded to individual vic-
tims of comparable aggressive war and occupation activity.
Where, as a practical matter, in the instance of Iraq's assault on
Kuwait and Kurdistan, the civilian residents may only obtain
relief from state reparations, the rationale for the existing bar of
state immunity, under current sovereign immunity practice,
must be reconsidered. Indeed, the recent events compel a con-
sideration of a new multilateral treaty which explicitly elimi-
nates the availability of state immunity from the sovereign
states of the world, except for a very limited number of sover-
eign acts and assets. Sovereign immunity would then become the
exception and not the rule. Such a treaty could also establish as
a part of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) new civil and
criminal divisions which would be available to hear individual
petitions and claims against states. If a new tribunal is not es-
tablished, the principles of universal jurisdiction should be re-
lied on so that violations of customary international law can be
reviewed by municipal courts.
This article attempts to examine the situation in which
many thousands of ordinary residents of Kuwait and Kurdistan
alike now find themselves as to their legal standing to sue and
their ability to recover compensation and damages for their or
their deceased relatives' individual injuries, suffering and loss.
The analysis will assume that neither the ruling Baath Party it-
self nor the Iraqi individuals and officials responsible (with the
exception of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President who may have
amassed a considerable fortune) will personally be able to satisfy
any judgment awards resulting from their actions in Kuwait and
Kurdistan. While individual officials, including the members of
the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, may be joined in any
action, the primary possibility of such claims being met lies in
1. U.N. Resolution 674 explicitly provides notice to Iraq that under international
law it will bear full liability for loss, damage and injury suffered by individuals as well as
entities as a result of its aggression. U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990).
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the enforcement of judgments against the State of Iraq itself.
Consequently, the principal focus here will be on a consideration
of the basis, forum, jurisdiction and venue of such actions as
well as the extent to which Iraq or its President, in particular,
might be able to claim sovereign immunity from such legal
actions.
Part two of this article will focus on the types of injuries
inflicted on the Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims which provide the
basis for their claims. Part three will survey the relevant munici-
pal laws and practices of Kuwait, the United Kingdom and the
United States in bringing such actions and the status of state
immunity which might be asserted by Iraq. In considering the
immunity afforded to foreign states under United States law, the
act of state doctrine is also examined. Part four asserts and ex-
amines the principle that sovereign immunity should finally be
deemed to be inapplicable to states which as a matter of policy
violate the most basic norms of customary international law -
the jus cogens. Professor Brownlie noted that norms of custom-
ary international law are rules which ". . . cannot be set aside
by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subse-
quent customary rule of contrary' effect ... ."I In the course of
this analysis the growth of customary international law, the rela-
tionship between international law and municipal law, and the
applicability of the jus cogens violations to Iraqi actions in Ku-
wait and Kurdistan are discussed, as are the historical prece-
dents for intervention in such cases.
Part five comments on the possibility of the establishment
of an independent international tribunal to hear such cases. Part
six argues that, in the absence of such a tribunal, the principles
of universal jurisdiction and erga omnes have historical and con-
temporary relevance as to the obligations of all states to prohibit
and review jus cogens violations so that their municipal courts
may be utilized to provide fora to consider the claims. Finally,
part seven examines the most significant obstacles and objec-
tions to the application of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction
to the courts of the United States in such cases.
Excluded from this consideration is the functioning of the
United Nations Compensation Commission which was estab-
lished to function along the lines of the United States/Iran
Claims Tribunal. It is, however, interesting to note that Charles
2. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 499 (2d ed. 1973).
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Brower, a judge of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at
the Hague since 1984, stated that the attempt to establish a sim-
ilar tribunal to handle the hundreds of thousands of individual
claims against Iraq would be wholly unworkable. He noted that
nearly eight years after beginning to review claims the Iran/
United States Tribunal and its panel of nine judges were still at
work on the last of the nearly 4,000 claims filed, and that it
would have been worse had the United States and Iran not set-
tled 2,500 small claims as a group.3 Nevertheless, the United Na-
tions decided to establish yet another claims tribunal to assess
damage claims submitted by individual states on behalf of their
nationals and impose binding awards upon Iraq. I believe it to
be inevitable that the Compensation Commission will focus on
the types of damage referred to above (physical, environmental
and corporate) to the detriment of the claims of the individuals
whose injuries, deaths and losses are always more expedient to
ignore.
II. THE RANGE OF CLAIMS
Both the Kuwaitis and the Kurds suffered at the hands of
the Iraqi forces; both have potential claims. As is usual in war,
the civilians left behind were, in large part, the most helpless
members of Kuwaiti society. Those able to do so fled to safety.
Thousands of others without the resources or opportunity to ex-
ercise mobility were left behind to face the tender mercies of
three separate Iraqi intelligence groups - the Army, the Baath
party and the Government (the Mukhabarat) - who were
clearly ordered to systematically suppress any resistance to the
Kuwaiti annexation through the institutionalized use of massive
intimidation and terror. Non-Kuwaitis included in this group
who stayed and suffered were Egyptians, Pakistanis, Filipinos
and Palestinians. The most powerless of these - the "Bedouin"
- who cannot own property, have no identification and are not
allowed to work without a respectable Kuwaiti's recommenda-
tion, suffered the most, and yet will be the easiest to ignore
when it comes to compensation.
In view of the extensive publicity - indeed media overload
- surrounding the incidents of torture, other assaults and inju-
ries visited upon the residents of Kuwait who remained during
3. Charles Brower, United Nations Considers how Iraq Should Pay Reparations,
FIN. Trnms, Apr. 11, 1991, at 10.
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Iraq's occupation, as well as upon the Kurds who were trapped
by the advancing Iraqi forces, it is sufficient to summarize here
the types of injury for which relief is entitled. Further details, as
documented and provided by official Kuwaiti sources, is in-
cluded at a later point.
On the basis of present information and evidence, much of
which is derived from eyewitness accounts and the various tools
of torture left behind, there is no doubt that the deaths and in-
juries resulted from serious crimes perpetrated on civilians, and
not from the commission of delicts, torts or "civil wrongs." The
offenses include summary execution and criminal assaults, beat-
ings, systematic torture including rape, very often - in light of
the extreme pain and suffering - relieved by death. Children
were tortured in front of their parents and vice versa. Members
of families were randomly executed before their relatives who
were compelled to watch, and bodies were publicly hanged near
their former homes. Young girls and women suffered torture by
rape at the hands of marauding soldiers and intelligence opera-
tives, often in front of members of their families.
Many disappeared, taken from their homes to one or an-
other "interrogation" center, never to be seen again. Post occu-
pation visitors to these places have reported dried blood, rem-
nants of human flesh and organs and the tools and equipment of
torture everywhere. In the -last days of the Iraqi occupation,
there seemed to be a concerted attempt by the occupying forces
to eliminate the evidence of the brutalization through what ap-
pears to be a systematic effort to round up previous victims,
murder them and fill unmarked mass graves in trenches dug
outside of the city. Finally, although not the specific concern of
this article, there was a wide range of looting, transportation of
property to Iraq and destruction of property, not only public
property but that belonging to private individuals. The destruc-
tion, damage and loss is virtually incalculable. These acts pro-
vide the basis for the claims by thousands of Kuwaiti residents.
Similar treatment was meted out to the Kurds by advancing
Iraqi forces in Kurdistan (northern Iraq) as a part of a system-
atic attempt to eliminate all Kurdish opposition. The systematic
assaults focused on the Kurds was genocidal, causing approxi-
mately two and a half million persons to flee from their homes,
villages and cities to uncertain fates in the surrounding moun-
tain ranges. Pursued relentlessly by Iraqi soldiers, countless sur-
vivors of the original attacks were ultimately murdered in flight
19921
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or died from the intolerable conditions.
Documents obtained by Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers reveal
the official state policy of the Iraqi Government toward the
Kurds. One such document is an Order signed by the Dohok
Province Security Director providing instructions to army of-
ficers and noncommissioned officers on how to deal with any
anti-government civilian unrest, or demonstrations and demon-
strators. The Order requires that any such groups be surrounded
and all routes of escape cut off and then:
4. After implementing the above and surrounding the enemy
elements firearms force to be used under Central Commanders
Instructions to kill 95% of them leaving the remainder for
interrogation.4
III. CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND/OR WRONGFUL DEATH BY
THE VICTIMS OF IRAQI AGGRESSION
The Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims could conceivably bring
actions in either Kuwait, the United Kingdom or the United
States. However, substantial problems in obtaining adequate
compensation exist in each jurisdiction.
A. Kuwaiti Jurisdiction
1. The Causes of Action
Primary jurisdiction for the commencement of any personal
injury and/or wrongful death claims on behalf of Kuwaiti resi-
dents obviously resides in Kuwait itself as the place of injury. If
a conventional claim is prosecuted through the domestic courts
of Kuwait with local law being applied as the lex loci delicti the
provisions of the Kuwait Civil Code (the Civil Code) would gov-
ern. The Civil Code contains standard provisions identifying tor-
tious conduct as injurious acts upon another person or persons
whereby liability is lodged not only with the tortfeasor, but also
with any "incitor" or "abettor. ' 5 The Civil Code explicitly pro-
vides that: "Each one of the several persons whose fault has
caused the harm shall be liable to the party who suffered the
4. Dohok Province Security Directorate, Ref. 48, Order of March 6, 1991 (on file
with author).
5. Kuwait Civil Code, Division 1, Rights in Pefsonam (Personal Rights) or Obliga-
tions Book 1, Part 1, Ch. 3 - Injurious Acts, 1 Responsibility for Unlawful Acts, Article
227(1).
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harm for reparation of the harm caused."'
Reparations are required to be paid by the tortfeasor - or
the state if the tortfeasor cannot be found7 - and are based
upon any loss naturally resulting from the injury as well as "...
sorrow and anguish. . . (and) emotional loss of love and tender-
ness (compassion) resulting from the death of a dear one."8 In
the instance of wrongful death, right of action vests in surviving
.. . spouses and relatives to the second degree."9
The Civil Code contains one curious provision, however,
which should be noted:
A public official shall not be held responsible for an act
committed by him which caused injury to another person if he
had implemented the provisions of law or complied with an or-
der given by a superior if he had or believed on acceptable
grounds he had to obey, and if he proves that he had reasona-
ble grounds which made him believe that the act committed by
him to be legitimate and that in carrying out his act he exer-
cised due care.10
If Kuwaiti substantive law was to apply to actions against any
Iraqi officials acting on the orders of their superiors, this provi-
sion could constitute an obstacle to the establishment of liabil-
ity, although it clearly was not intended to hold harmless offi-
cials of a foreign occupying state who commit acts of torture,
rape and summary murder on civilians residing in the occupied
territory.
Compensation under the Civil Code is to be determined by
a judge in currency in accordance with the rules of the Shari'a
diyet (blood money) without any distinction being made be-
tween the status of individuals." The diyet award is, in addition
to compensation, required to make the victim whole, although
the local standards are quite different from those observed in
the West.' 2 A full diyet - e.g. for loss of life - is fixed at 10,000
Dinars (approximately £2,000 or $4,000 as of 30-5-91), 13 so, by
western standards, and certainly those currently followed in the
6. Id. art. 230(1).
7. Id. art. 256.
8. Id. art. 231.
9. Id.
10. Id. art. 237.
11. Id. art. 248.
12. Id. art. 247.
13. Id. art. 251.
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United States and the United Kingdom, the compensation must
be regarded as minimal.
Consequently, with the exception of the provision indemni-
fying individuals for officially sanctioned acts reasonably be-
lieved to be legitimate, there are clear grounds for actions to be
brought under Kuwaiti substantive law.
2. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States
Kuwaiti municipal law appears to contain no restrictive pro-
visions as to sovereign immunity, and hence full state immunity
would likely attach to Iraq and its President. One of the very
few doctrinal references to state immunity from proceedings -
although in a commercial context - stated that state or govern-
mental agencies are considered to have waived their immunity if
they enter into agreements to arbitrate in commercial disputes.14
Victims seeking relief in Kuwait, however, would doubtless ar-
gue that Iraq has waived its immunity by acceding to a host of
international treaties, conventions, agreements and protocols
which explicitly prohibit the type of conduct which lrovides the
basis for the actions.
B. United Kingdom Jurisdiction
1. The Causes of Action
A number of Kuwaiti and Kurdish residents with one or
more claims resulting from Iraq's aggression fled to the United
Kingdom and took up residence there during or after the occu-
pation. In many instances, aggrieved families and individuals
may wish to initiate legal action against Iraq in the High Court
of England and Wales. Under English law, torts committed
abroad are justiciable in England and such actions are possibly
subject to two conditions which establish the rule of double
actionability.
In Phillips v. Eyre," Judge Willes set forth the general rule
for acts committed abroad: "in order to found a suit in England
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two condi-
tions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a char-
acter that it would have been actionable if committed in Eng-
14. See SAMIR SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 260
(1984).
15. [1870] 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1 (Eng.).
[Vol. XVIII:2
CRIMES OF STATE
land. . . . Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by
the law of the place where it was done . . -. Conduct that is
"not justifiable," according to the House of Lords in Boys v.
Chaplin,7 is confined to that which is civilly actionable in the
country of commission, clearly establishing the principle as a
rule of double actionability by civil law. As to the applicable law
to be applied, Lords Wilberforce and Hodson in Boys v. Chaplin
espoused a flexible correlation between the lex fori and the lex
loci delecti to the extent that there was acceptance of the "sig-
nificant relationship" test which requires that the applicable law
be that of the place which has the most significant relationship
with the place of occurrence and the parties.
In the instance of any Kuwaiti and Kurdish tort-based ac-
tions, there would appear to be little doubt that the substantive
law of Kuwait or Iraq would be applied, though the action may
be brought in England. The obvious problem is that the plaintiff
victims would be no closer in their attempt to secure adequate
compensation (by Anglo-American standards) by bringing their
actions in England since the compensation level under Kuwaiti
law is minimal. Compensation could be adequate, however, if the
court's consideration of damages was not regarded as a part of
the substantive law governing the case, but rather interpreted as
procedural and therefore to be determined by the lex fori. Al-
though the House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin disagreed on the
issue of how damages were to be considered, 8 it appears that, in
principle, matters of quantification or assessment of damages
have generally come to be regarded as being procedural, whereas
the actionability of a particular type of damages is substantive. 9
Consequently, it appears that violations of international
law, which may also be viewed as foreign torts, are justiciable in
England. The English Courts generally may exercise a discre-
tionary control over the choice of forum. It should also be noted
that the Brussels Convention of 1968 (art. 5(3)),2 ° which is ap-
16. Id. at 28-29.
17. [1971] App. Cas. 356 (appeal taken from Eng.).
18. In Boys v. Chaplin, Lords Hodson, Wilberforce and Pearson regarded damages
as substantive, and thus governed by applicable law; Lords Donovan and Guest regarded
damages as procedural, hence the lex fori. Id.
19. ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1405-07 (Law-
rence Collins et al. eds., 11th ed. 1987).
20. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), revised by Convention
on Accession to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
1992]
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plied to the United Kingdom by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments Act of 1982,21 allows for an action in tort where the harm
took place. The European Court has held that this gives a plain-
tiff the dual option of suing where the harm originated or where
the resulting damage occurred.22 Further, even though the likely
governing law of the case would be the law of Kuwait, the quan-
tification of the damages would likely be considered a procedural
matter and fixed in accordance with English law, allowing those
victims with standing to sue in England to realize compensation
in an amount far greater than that possible in the Kuwaiti
courts.
2. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States
In 1783, Blackstone described the law of nations as a
system of rules deducible by national reason and established by
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world
...adopted (in England) in its full extent by the common law
and held to be part of the law of the land. '23 It would take, how-
ever, nearly another two hundred years for the government of
his native land to begin to move away from its historical refusal
to apply any part of the law of nations to other sovereign states.
Only very gradually has the English law abandoned the
common law doctrine of absolute immunity of foreign sover-
eigns. A more restrictive view of the state immunity doctrine be-
gan to emerge in the late 1970s with the Privy Council ruling in
1977 that immunity did not extend to actions in rem against for-
eign government vessels engaged in purely trading activities.2 4 In
a different case the restriction was further extended to actions in
personam.25 On November 22, 1978 Parliament replaced the
common law doctrine with the State Immunity Act of 1978 (the
and Commercial Matters, Oct. 9, 1978, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 8 (1979).
21. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, § 2 (Eng.).
22. Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines Potaisse d'alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1 C.M.L.R. 284
(1977).
23. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (G. Chase ed.,
4th ed. 1923) (1783).
24. The Phillipine Admiral, [1977] App. Cas. 373 (Eng. P.C. 1975) (appeal taken
from H.K.).
25. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (Eng.).
See also Hispano Americano Mercantil S.A. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 277 (Eng. C.A.); The I Congresso del Partido, [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 23 (Eng.), rev'd,
[1983] 1 App. Cas. 244 (appeal taken from Eng.); Planmount v. Republic of Zaire, [1980]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 393 (Eng. C.A.).
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Act), which had the effect of restricting the immunity of foreign
states from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom
in cases where the cause of action relates to commercial transac-
tions undertaken by the foreign state or where the commission
of a wrong in the United Kingdom makes it appropriate for the
obligations of the foreign state to be determined by United
Kingdom courts.
Although the Act provides a broad definition of those com-
mercial transactions to which the restriction applies, injury must
be based upon an act or omission occurring in the United King-
dom. Further, any acts in the exercise of sovereign authority are
excluded. Therefore, even for activity in the United Kingdom, if
a state can show that it acted in its governmental capacity, its
immunity will hold good under the Act. However, an entity sep-
arate from the state with an independent legal personality is ex-
cluded from state immunity under the Act, except if its actions
constitute an exercise of sovereign authority that would provide
immunity to the state itself.2"
Collecting judgments under the Act will be difficult. Even if
proceedings may be initiated against foreign states, their assets
and property are basically exempt from remedies generally
available in the English courts. Excepting clearly identifiable
commercial assets, accounts or property, foreign states are gen-
erally immune from the execution of judgments from the En-
glish courts against their property. The onus of proving that
particular property is exempt from the protection of section 13
of the Act clearly falls upon a judgment creditor. It is ironic that
while the effect of the Act, and its intention, was to generally
codify the restriction of state immunity, as to enforcement it has
had the opposite effect. Attachment of or execution upon any
assets held in the United Kingdom by a state's central bank, or
other monetary authority is not allowed, subject to the possibil-
ity of assets being regarded as used or intended for commercial
purposes and thus attachable for that limited purpose.27 Thus,
state banks have more explicit privileges conferred upon them
by the Act than they may have had at common law.
It may be argued that in agreeing to accept and abide by
the United Nations Resolutions, including Resolution 674 on
26. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 14(2) (Eng.).
27. Id. § 14(4); Hispano Americano Mercantil S.A. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
[1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 277 (Eng. C.A.).
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reparations,28 Iraq has, as to the Kuwaiti victims, by implication
waived its state immunity as to the personal injuries, death and
damage caused by the invasion and occupation. Such waiver or
agreement to submit to the jurisdiction, even if allowed, how-
ever, does not imply any submission to the enforcement jurisdic-
tion of the courts under the Act. To the contrary, it appears
clear that a separate consent is required in order to allow en-
forcement to be effected.29 Consequently, absent a substantive
change in the way that the United Kingdom courts currently in-
terpret the Act, where there would be an exclusion of immunity
in cases involving jus cogens violations under international law,
it appears that it would likely be a frustrating and unproductive
exercise for Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims residing in the United
Kingdom to attempt to proceed in the courts of England with
conventional tort actions against Iraq.
The claims of the Kuwaiti victims appear to be actionable
and justiciable in the United Kingdom, with Kuwaiti substan-
tive law and English procedural law likely to be applied. How-
ever, the absence of any explicit waiver or relevant restriction of
Iraq's sovereign immunity in such cases, the probable reluctance
of the court to infer waiver from Iraq's agreement to Resolution
67430 and the likely unavailability for attachment and examina-
tion of Iraq's United Kingdom property and assets appear to be
insurmountable obstacles.
C. United States Jurisdiction
1. The Causes of Action
The ability of any Kuwaitis and Kurds who have taken up
residence in the United States during or subsequent to the inva-
sion and occupation to mount viable tort actions in that country
appears, at first glance, to be equally dismal.
Since 1789, there has been statutory authority under the
Alien Tort Statute (section 1350) for the federal district courts
to assume original jurisdiction of any civil action brought by ari
alien for a tort which is committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.3 1 The action may only
28. See infra note 73.
29. State Immunity Act, 1978, § 2(2) (Eng.).
30. See infra note 73.
31. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982)).
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be for tortious conduct, and there is no jurisdictional or diversity
requirement. The drafters of section 1350, who appear to have
been influenced by Blackstone, authorized actions based on civil
as well as criminal acts. Thus, even if international criminals es-
caped prosecution elsewhere for their acts, they could still be
sued in the courts of the United States and required to pay com-
pensation to victims for the damage and loss resulting from their
actions.
During the nineteenth century, the earlier application of the
"law of nations" to criminal and civil injuries and its extension
to the regulation of matters between individuals, individuals and
states and between states, whereby individuals could sue and be
sued thereon, became statist in orientation, excluding individual
or nonstate parties from international legal proceedings. Thus,
during this period, individuals assumed a much reduced role
with, by and large, no legal capacity to enforce their rights. They
were deemed to be objects of international law whose claims
could be vindicated only through actions of their sovereign
states.3 2 Throughout this period, the actions of states toward
their citizens were regarded as being entirely domestic concerns
for which they were not obliged to answer under international
law. The rights of citizens, such as they were at that time, were
vicariously related to their status; an injury to a citizen outside
of his or her state could only be addressed as an injury to the
citizen's state itself.
Section 1350 was virtually unused for nearly 200 years, al-
though it was initially considered in 1795 shortly after the pas-
sage of the First Judiciary Act.33 In that same year, Attorney
General William Bradford issued an opinion stating that aliens
injured in an episode involving the plundering of a British set-
tlement on the African Coast could bring a suit under section
1350 as to acts that violated the law of nations. 4 More than a
century later, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte stated that
section 1350 could provide aliens with a "forum" and a "right of
action." 5 He referred, however, to both section 1350 and the di-"
32. See George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law,
46 AM. J. INT'L L. 4281 (1952); Andrew M. Scoble, Enforcing the Customary Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights, 74 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130-31 (1986).
33. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.C.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
34. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
35. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907).
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versity statute, section 1332, so some ambiguity resulted.3 6
It was only following the two world wars, and World War II
in particular, that a fundamental change took root in the status
and rights of the individual, reflected in the status of interna-
tional human rights in international law. Accordingly, in line
with this change of international perspective, in 1961 federal
subject matter jurisdiction in United States courts was finally
formally held to vest in section 1350. In that year in Abdul-
Rajman Omar Adra v. Clift,3 7 the Maryland district court,
though ultimately rejecting the plaintiff's claim, nevertheless as-
sumed jurisdiction of a tort involving international law (passport
falsification) and noted that such law does apply in regards to
the rights of individuals, stating that private individuals must
learn that ". . . there are acts of which that law . . . (interna-
tional law) itself forbids the commission by any one
whomsoever." 8
a. Cases Where Section 1350 Jurisdiction Has Been
Denied
In general, actions under section 1350 have been declined by
federal district courts as a result of the plaintiff's failure to
demonstrate that there has been a violation of international law
or a treaty of the United States.39 For example, in Lopes v.
Reederei Richard Schroder," the court held that, both in re-
spect of the law of nations as it was in 1789 and international
law as it had evolved since that time, negligence had never cus-
36. Id.
37. 195 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
38. Id. at 864.
39. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (child cus-
tody not a rule of international law); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (air crashes); IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Eighth Commandment not part of law of na-
tions); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., 475 F.2d 142, 144-45 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 866 (1973) (fraudulent failure to train plaintiffs as executives not a violation of
international law); Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d
Cir. 1960) (law of nations does not give universal right of unimpeded access to harbors);
Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (government's
expropriation of property of its own nationals not prohibited by law of nations); Valanga
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 327-29 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (claim for pro-
ceeds from life insurance policy did not allege tort in violation of law of nations or U.S.
Treaty).
40. 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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tomarily been regarded as a violation thereof.41 The Lopes court
also implied, but did not make explicit, that a state's treatment
of its own citizens would not be a concern of the law of nations.4 2
Subsequently, in 1976 the Second Circuit in Dreyfus v. Von
Finck,43 denied plaintiff's claim for relief based on alleged viola-
tions of four treaties to which the United States-was a party.
44
The court held that the four treaties in question did not contain
provisions relating to the expropriation by Germany of property
owned by German nationals and thus conferred no private rights
or causes of action regarding such property that were enforcea-
ble in the courts of the United States. 45 The court went on to
state, similar to Lopes, that violations of international law can-
not be deemed to have occurred when the victims are nationals
of the offending state.46 It should be noted that the Dreyfus
court did not distinguish or discuss the Abdul-Rahman case re-
ferred to above.,"
In retrograde fashion, the courts in Lopes and Dreyfus
adopted a statist conception of international law in respect of
section 1350 that was conclusively rejected by the Second Cir-
cuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,5 four years after the same court
affirmed Dreyfus. Filartiga was an action brought against a
Paraguayan citizen personally, and not against the State of Par-
aguay, by the sister and father of a man tortured to death in
Paraguay by the defendant, a government official. The district
court dismissed the action on the grounds that two prior Second
Circuit cases had established that a nation's treatment of its
own citizens was-beyond the reach of jurisdiction under section
1350.:1 The Second Circuit upheld the entertainment of jurisdic-
tion under section 1350. On remand the district court awarded
41. Id. at 296-97.
42. Id. at 297.
43. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
44. E.g., Four Power Occupation Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany,
Nov. 14, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2062, 236 U.N.T.S. 359; Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Con. T.S. 188
(submitted to Congress but not ratified); Hague Convention No. IV, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 205 Con. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
45. Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Abdul-Rajman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
48. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v.
Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); see also Dreyfus, 534
F.2d at 30-31.
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compensatory and punitive damages. In reversing and remand-
ing, the Second Circuit examined a wide range of sources, 50 and
in a landmark decision held that:
1. The "law of nations" under Section 1350 includes the evolv-
ing international law of human rights, and federal courts in
considering whether or not to assume jurisdiction under the
statute should interpret international law as it exists at the
time of the case and not as it was in 1789.51
2. By international consensus a universal law of human rights
had emerged in treaties and customary international law,
which affords substantive rights to individuals from which no
state may derogate and which places limits on the treatment of
its citizens by any state.52
Judge Irving Kaufman stated that a rule of international law
could only provide a basis for an action under section 1350 if it
was clearly a part of such substantive law, and that the test
must be a stringent one so one nation's courts would not be
tempted to impose "idiosyncratic" legal rules on others under
the guise of international law. He attributed the dearth of cases
under section 1350 to this stringent requirement and noted that
this threshold difficulty resulted in more dismissals than occur
under other jurisdictional statutes. He concluded that previous
section 1350 cases had not involved such well established norms
of international law as those raised by Filartiga53
Four years after Filartiga and a change in United States po-
litical administration, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
with each judge writing a separate and differing opinion in justi-
fication, rejected a claim made under section 1350 that was
prompted by a terrorist attack allegedly involving the Palestine
Liberation Organization. 4 Judge Edwards upheld section 1350
jurisdiction in such cases, but said it only extended to acts tradi-
tionally warranting universal jurisdiction such as piracy or slave
50. For example, U.N. Charter, various U.N. Resolutions, a range of treaties, cove-
nants and protocols, the Constitutions of the United States and Paraguay and various
writings of jurists. The court also took into consideration an amicus curiae brief jointly
submitted by the Departments of State and Justice which stated that there was a con-
sensus among nations that the prohibition of torture was currently customary interna-
tional law.
51. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84.
52. Id. at 878, 881-85.
53. Id. at 887-88.
54. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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trading or other offenses which comparably contravened current
norms of international law.55 Judge Bork voted to dismiss based
upon both an absence of an explicit cause of action under sec-
tion 1350 and the principle of the separation of powers, which
mandated consideration of the act of state doctrine and the po-
litical question doctrine. 56 Judge Robb also affirmed dismissal on
the basis that the case presented a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion, though he conceded that such cases could stand as limited
exceptions .5 Reflecting, it appears, the change in political orien-
tation represented by the Reagan Administration after that of
the Carter Administration during the Filartiga period, the gov-
ernment, by way of an amicus brief, urged the Supreme Court to
deny certiorari, which it did without comment."8
The district court of the District of Columbia similarly dis-
missed on political question grounds the plaintiff's section 1350
claims in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,59 which were based on
acts and consequences arising out of United States intervention
in Nicaragua. In affirming the district court's decision, Judge
Scalia - then on the D.C. Court of Appeals - went out of his
way to state that the holding in Sanchez-Espinoza did not nec-
essarily conflict with Filartiga° since domestic sovereign immu-
nity and not foreign sovereign immunity was involved. He wrote:
".. . it does not necessarily follow that an Alien Tort Statute
suit filed against the officer of a foreign sovereign would have to
be dismissed. Thus, nothing in today's decision conflicts with
the decision of the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
,,61
Then, in Farag M. Mohammed Saltany v. Ronald M. Rea-
gan, the District of Columbia district court dismissed on sover-
eign immunity and political question grounds, the various sec-
tion 1350 and other claims based upon the resulting death,
personal injury and destruction arising from air strikes con-
ducted by the United States military on targets in Libya during
April 1986.62 The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed but reversed as
55. Id. at 781.
56. Id. at 801-20 (Bork, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 823, 825 (Robb, J., concurring).
58. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
59. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
60. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 207.
62. 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988).
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to the issue of sanctions against plaintiff's counsel.63 The Su-
preme Court denied certiorari. 4
The United States Government's view, when it submitted
its amicus brief in Filartiga, was that individuals should have
the right to sue under section 1350 in order to enforce their
rights. It thereby confirmed that United States law incorporates
international law and was thus in accord with the emerging
views of the courts of other countries.65 Under this view, evolv-
ing international law provides to individuals substantive and
justiciable rights which may be enforced in municipal courts. In
the United States, federal common law and the jurisdiction
available for the adjudication of such claims under section 1350
provides the statutory foundation for enforcement.
It should thus appear settled that, as under English law, ac-
tions by resident aliens may be brought in the United States
federal courts for these kinds of foreign acts; but any summary
of this aspect of law must take into account the political climate
and administration policy since 1980, which seems intent upon
reducing the impact of Filartiga. The Justice Department's ami-
cus brief in the consolidated cases of Trajano v. Marcos6" would
63. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
64. Saltany v. Reagan, 495 U.S. 932 (1990). The imposition of monetary and profes-
sional sanctions against plaintiff's counsel under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure appears to be a growing practice, particularly in civil rights cases in the
United States. Ostensibly used to discourage "frivolous" law suits, such orders can only
have significant political consequences resulting in a chilling effect upon the desire to
resort to the courts by individuals and groups whose rights have been violated or denied.
One must wonder what will become of the anger, hurt and frustration of such victims if
they have no hope of seeking redress by going to law before an independent judiciary.
The transfer of an airing of these grievances from the courtroom to the streets, once
again, could well result in demonstration of the shortsightedness of such judicial policy.
65. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 602-03 n.44 (1980), citing cases
from the Constitutional Court of Germany, the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
the Court of First Instance of Courtrai (Belgium); see also The Paquette Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900).
66. No. 86-2448 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1986) (unpublished), aff'd, 1992 WL 295673 (9th
Cir. Oct. 21, 1992). See also Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.
1980), 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1125 (1985); Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Maiorana v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909); The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113 (1895); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Haustein v. Lyn-
ham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 557 (1854);
Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 483 (1838); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 181 (1825); Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824); Orr v. Hodgeson,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817); Harden v.
Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300 (1816); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7
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limit jurisdiction to torts committed by United States citizens or
other persons subject to its jurisdiction and to situations where
the United States might be held similarly accountable to the of-
fended state. On its face, a plain reading of section 1350 denies
the validity of this interpretation; the Ninth Circuit agreed in
Trajano when it held for the first time that United States courts
can exercise jurisdiction over causes of action based on the mis-
treatment by a foreign leader of his own subjects.6
It appears evident, however, that the recent administrations
have taken a political foreign relations decision contrary to the
result in Trajano, and courts routinely influenced by Justice De-
partment amicus briefs may reasonably be expected to issue de-
cisions in conflict with the law in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover,
as under English law, the cause of action is one thing, but the
right and standing of individuals to bring such actions not only
against other individuals, but against sovereign states, is critical
to the determination of whether the existing right at law has a
correlative remedy under United States law.
2. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States
The immunity of foreign states as a principle of interna-
tional law was first recognized by the courts of the United States
in 1812 in the case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden.6 s In
that case, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the immunity from
seizure and court action of a vessel of a foreign sovereign, at
peace with the United States, coming into a United States port.
He noted that the recognition of immunity, though not a right
compelled by law, was based upon notions of grace and comity
between nations. With the passage of time such determinations
of sovereign immunity became closely connected to ". . reli-
ance upon the practices and policies of the State Department."6
In May 1952, in accordance with the "Tate Letter" practice
issued by the Department of State,7 0 a restrictive approach to
Cranch) 603 (1812); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864-65 (E.D. Md. 1961); Jordan J. Paust, Litigating
Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81 (1981).
67. It should be noted in passing that the per curiam opinion in Trajano, by direc-
tion of the court, will not be published but will stand only as the law of the instant case.
68. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
69. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
70. 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
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the immunity of foreign states was adopted which recognized
immunity only in respect of a foreign sovereign's public acts, but
not in instances involving its private or commercial activities.
No consideration appears to have been given or reference made
at that time to the issue of immunity attaching to torts/crimes
such as those which have occurred in Kuwait and Kurdistan.
The "Tate Letter" practice, however, provided an unsatis-
factory situation since a political institution was empowered to
provide ad hoc legal standards to litigation already commenced,
and where various diplomatic pressures and political trade-offs
would inevitably tarnish the development of an objective stan-
dard of law. This anomaly eventually resulted in the passage of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).7 1
The FSIA statute was designed to incorporate the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity, thus formally ending the
practice of judicial deference to suggestions from the executive
branch. The inescapable legislative intent has to be that since
the issues of state immunity were to be judicially determined
any political intervention by the executive would thereafter be
inappropriate.
Section 1330 of the FSIA provides for subject matter and
personal jurisdiction of the federal district courts over foreign
states, including political subdivisions, agencies and instrumen-
talities of the foreign state. Jurisdiction extends to any claim for
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity as set forth
in sections 1605 to 1607. Pursuant to section 1604, a foreign
state waives immunity by acceding to existing treaties or other
international agreements in existence at the time of passage of
the FSIA, and to which the United States is a party. Section
1604 is explicit, stating that:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign State shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as pro-
vided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.72
The language of this section must be interpreted in light of the
fact that Iraq and the United States had at all relevant times
acceded to the multilateral treaties of the United Nations Char-
71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
72. Id.
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ter (Charter) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva
Fourth), as well as voting for and accepting the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration) and Resolu-
tions 666, 670, 674 and the terms of the ceasefire set out in Reso-
lution 687. 73 Iraq formally accepted the terms of Resolution 687
73. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, 3(1) GAOR Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). U.N. SCOR,
2939th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990); U.N. SCOR, 2943d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/670 (1990); U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); U.N.
SCOR, 2981st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
The U.N. Charter, Article 55 states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on re-
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the
United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights, fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56 states: "All Members pledge themselves td take joint and separate action
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55."
The Universal Declaration
Article 2 states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, langauge, religion,
political or other opiiion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
Article 3 states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."
Article 5 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment."
Article 8 states: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitu-
tion or by law."
Article 9 states: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
Article 10 states: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions and of any criminal charge against him."
Article 17 states: "1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Article 30 states: "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
Geneva Fourth
Article 2 states:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if said occupation meets with
no armed resistance . . ..
Article 27 states:
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Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their per-
sons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices,
and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated,
and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof
and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault
Article 29 states: "The party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may
be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any
individual responsibility which may be incurred."
Article 31 states: "No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected
persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties."
Article 32 states:
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited
from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering
or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies
not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or
scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected
person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian
or military agents.
Article 33 states: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has
not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation
or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons
and their property are prohibited."
Article 34 states: "The taking of hostages is prohibited."
Article 49 states: "Individuals or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."
Article 53 states: "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal prop-
erty belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organisations, is prohibited, except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."
Article 57 states:
The Occupying Power may requisition civilian hospitals only temporarily and
only in cases of urgent necessity for the care of military wounded and sick, and
then on condition that suitable arrangements are made in due time for the care
and treatment of the patients and for the needs of the civilian population for
hospital accommodation.
The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be requisitioned so long as
they are necessary for the needs of the civilian population.
Article 68 states:
• . . The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person un-
less the attention of the court has been particularly called to the fact that since
the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by
any duty of allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected
person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.
Article 71 states: "No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the
Occupying Power except after a regular trial."
Article 75 states:
In no case shall.persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of peti-
tion for pardon or reprieve. No death sentence shall be carried out before the
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after the fact. 4 In addition, though not relevant to the Kuwaiti
victims, Iraq and the United States are both parties to the 1948
United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide (the
Genocide Convention) which is directly applicable to the aggres-
sive actions by Iraq against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq,
both before and in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation
of Kuwait. 5
expiration of a period of at least six months from the date of receipt by the
Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment confirming such
death sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve.
Resolutions 666, 670, 674 and 687
Resolution 666 states: ". .. 2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under
Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms
that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with
international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion; ..."
Resolution 670 states:
...13. Reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and
that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply
fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in re-
spect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or
order the commission of grave breaches.
Resolution 674 states: ". . .8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable
for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait
by Iraq; ..."
Resolution 687 (the cease-fire resolution) states:
The Security Council. ..
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention. .. .Noting that. ..
many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for . . .Re-
calling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened
for signature on 18 December 1979, which categorises all acts of taking hos-.
tages as manifestations of international terrorism, . ..
1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above except as expressly charged be-
low to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;...
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq
arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal
mechanisms, is liable under international lawfor any direct loss, damage, in-
cluding environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury
to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlaw-
ful invasion and occupation of Kuwait; ...
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall
within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer
the Fund;
74. See Alan Cowell, After the War; Baghdad Formally Agrees to 'Unjust' U.N.
Conditions for Permanent Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at Al (the message of
acceptance was delivered to the United Nations by Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir A. Al-
Anbari).
75. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
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It is clear that should any existing treaty or other interna-
tional agreements conflict with a provision of the FSIA, then the
language of the relevant treaty or agreement would control.76 As
originally drafted, the FSIA section 1604 provision referred to
"future" as well as "existing" agreements, but the House Judici-
ary Committee struck the reference to any future agreements,
stating that such agreements would control in any event and
hence the language was unnecessary. 7
Section 1605 of the FSIA sets out exceptions to the princi-
ple of immunity of which only two relate to the individual
Kuwaiti and Kurdish claims, namely, 1605(a)(1) (explicit or im-
plicit waiver of immunity by the foreign state), and 1605(a)(5)
(personal injury or death occurring in the United States caused
by the tortious act or omission of the foreign state or any official
or employee of that state within the scope of office or employ-
ment). In the event that a foreign state is not entitled to immu-
nity from jurisdiction, FSIA section 1606 follows current inter-
national practice 78 by prohibiting the award of punitive damages
against a foreign state itself or any subdivision thereof, though
not of an agency or instrumentality of the state.
Under existing law and practice it appears that even if ac-
tions on behalf of Kuwaitis and Iraqis were maintainable against
Iraq, the all pervasive immunity of property and assets of a for-
eign state from attachment and execution would frustrate en-
forcement of any judgment. Section 1609 of the FSIA explicitly
immunizes such property and prohibits executions except in the
instance of waiver by the state or of property specifically con-
nected with commercial activity. For instance, in the Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 9 the claim against the Republic of Chile was
based on an act of political assassination on the streets of Wash-
ington D.C. The plaintiff could not obtain execution against the
assets of the defendant's national airline since the court held
that the claim did not arise from commercial activity. This re-
sult has been viewed as a clear illustration of the existence of a
opened for signature, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
77. Id.
78. 5 GREEN "H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 723-26 (1948); Fran-
cisco v. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility, 94 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURs 365, 476-81
(1958).
79. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
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right without a remedy.80
The right without a remedy result constitutes a major flaw
in the FSIA. Section 1605(a)(5) makes foreign states liable in
personam for the acts of their officials and employees, with cer-
tain exceptions which are not relevant to a case such as Letelier
or the instant cases. Section 1610(b)(2) does provide for enforce-
ment in such an instance of tort liability for physical injury or
death but does so solely against an agency or instrumentality of
such state which itself is engaged in carrying on commercial ac-
tivity in the United States. In the case of a tort by the state
there is no counterpart provision for execution against property
of the state itself. Section 1603(b)(1), (2), (3) defines an "agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state" as an entity which is a sep-
arate legal person, created by the laws of the state and capable
of suing and being sued in its own right and name. Thus, we
have a legal result in Letelier as follows:
(a)The Republic of Chile is liable for tortious acts committed
in the United States (1605(a)(5)).
(b)However, property of the State may not be subject to execu-
tion for such a non-commercial wrong (1610(a)).
(c)Property of an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the state
may be executed upon for such torts as come under 1605(a)(5),
but obviously the agency or instrumentality itself, having a
separate legal identity, would have to be sued in its own name
and found liable for execution to be allowed (1610(6)(2)).
(d)Since the Chilean national airline was not itself responsible
for the crimes and torts in Letelier (although it was alleged
that the explosives used were transported by the airline) its
property could not be executed upon and, similarly, no other
property of the state could be seized since commercial activity
was not involved.
The legislative drafting that provides for liability of foreign
states without a counterpart provision for a remedy must be
viewed not only as ludicrous but as bringing the law into disre-
pute. It only partially lowers the barrier to individual actions
against states and generally codifies the traditional view of the
United States that the property of foreign states is virtually ab-
solutely immune from execution.81 If one adds to this tortious
80. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
81. See Dexter and Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1930); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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picture the blanket immunity provided under section 1611 for
property of a foreign state if that property belongs to a foreign
ceitral bank or monetary authority, or is under the control of a
foreign military authority or defense agency, the possibility of
relief being obtained in the United States by the victims is even
more remote. Thus, it appears quite clear that in seeking to en-
sure reciprocal security, protection and immunity for its own
property outside of the United States, as well as to secure a
more friendly environment for United States corporations and
state agencies, instrumentalities and quasi-governmental enti-
ties, the United States Government, through the FSIA, has cre-
ated a formidable barrier to noncommercial actions against for-
eign states.
The contribution of the United States Supreme Court to
this current orientation is clearly evident in the case of the Ar-
gentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.2 In Amer-
ada Hess, the court held that the FSIA was the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states, stating that section
1604 bars state and federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
when a state is entitled to immunity and that section 1330(a)
confers jurisdiction when the foreign state is not entitled to im-
munity.8 3 In Amerada Hess, two Liberian corporations sued the
Argentine Republic to recover in tort for damages to their ves-
sels allegedly caused by Argentine armed forces in violation of
international law during the Falklands war. The district court
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that
the FSIA barred the actions.8 4 The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the FSIA was not meant to preclude relief or "...
remove existing remedies in the United States courts for viola-
tions of international law."85 In reversing, the Supreme Court
did not refer to human rights issues in respect of FSIA actions
against sovereign states.8 6 If, however, one assumes that the
FSIA is applicable to actions arising out of violations of jus
cogens norms and other crimes under international law (as ar-
gued later on in this article), Amerada Hess on its face appears
82. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
83. Id. at 434.
84. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
85. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir.
1987) (emphasis added).
86. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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to explicitly limit or preclude suits against foreign states based
on section 1350 unless the acts being complained of come within
one of the exceptions to immunity set out in the FSIA.
In this context, it is important to note the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia.7 This case involved an engineer recruited in the United
States for work in Saudi Arabia. While on the job in Saudi Ara-
bia, he complained about certain construction project violations,
and he was subsequently arrested and tortured. The district
court dismissed on FSIA grounds, stating that the foreign tort
did not fall within one of the exceptions. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that there were sufficient commercial contacts
and actions inside the United States to convey jurisdiction.8  At
this time, certiorari has been granted to the Supreme Court
where the court's ruling must face an uncertain fate.
If a section 1350 action is to be sustained on behalf of the
Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims of Iraqi activities, then the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of sections 1609 and 1610 of the
FSIA to date will have to change concerning human rights
claims.
a. Acts of State Under United States Law
Aside from the consideration of state statutory immunity
which must be overcome by individual victims, it must be noted
in passing that even if such statutory immunity is restricted in
cases involving violations of treaty, jus cogens norms or other
aspects of customary international law and recognized crimes,
such individual actions may still be barred in the United States
under the act of state doctrine. The development of the doctrine
in United States jurisprudence is clearly related to United
States municipal law and not to international law."" Historically,
it may be differentiated from sovereign immunity in that an act
of state finding is a rule of substantive law and is unrelated to
jurisdiction. In modern times it has become a catch-all prohibi-
tion against judicial interference in the executive's conduct of
foreign affairs.91 Having first surfaced in United States jurispru-
87. 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992).
88. Id.
89. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
90. See Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 300-01 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
91. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775
(1972); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Texas Trading and Mill-
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dence in the eighteenth century, it became well established by
Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in the often cited case of Un-
derhill v. Hernandez.2 He wrote:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 3
Beginning in 1964 the Supreme Court reexamined the doc-
trine as the result of a number of cases arising out of Cuban
expropriation of American assets. In Sabbatino,9 ' the Court held
that the act of state doctrine applied to such acts of expropria-
tion as alleged. Justice Harlan stated that the act of state doc-
trine rested upon "constitutional underpinnings" and was not
compelled by the nature of sovereign authority nor any principle
of international law.9 5 He noted that it was essential to consider
the "degree of codification or consensus" of a particular area of
international law or norm alongside the foreign relations - or
political question - issue.96 Justice Harlan further stressed that
the ruling in Sabbatino on the issue of expropriation was in no
way to be interpreted as foreclosing consideration of questions of
international law by United States courts.9"
In two subsequent cases eight and twelve years later,98 the
court reaffirmed the basic outlines of the doctrine, although its
underlying rationale continued to be the subject of debate. From
the outset, questions have been raised about the doctrine's rele-
vance or applicability to claims based on human rights viola-
tions.99 In any event, section 1350's jurisdictional requirement of
ing Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
92. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
93. Id.
94. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
95. Id. at 423.
96. Id. at 428.
97. Id. at 430 n.34.
98. Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
99. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, J.);
Richard Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in enforcing International Human Rights
Law, reprinted in THE GumE. To INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, 223, 227 (H.
Hannum ed., 1984); Jeffrey Blum & Ralph Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena
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consensus regarding the specific aspect of international law al-
legedly violated overcomes the Sabbatino test articulated by
Justice Harlan. Sabbatino itself was overruled as to such expro-
priations by passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment in 1965
which compelled United States courts to decide such cases on
the merits in accordance with the principles of international
law.100
There has emerged since Filartiga increasing support for
denying application of the doctrine in human rights cases in-
volving a state condoning or encouraging, as a matter of policy,
acts of genocide, slavery or slave trading, summary murder or
the forced disappearance of individuals, torture or other inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary
detention or systematic racial discrimination. The provisions of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Restatement (Third)) may be exemplary in this
regard.101
It is, however, evident that "executive suggestion," some-
times referred to as the "Bernstein exception," whereby the ex-
ecutive branch may communicate its opinion to the court con-
cerning the foreign policy impact of a case does, and will, take
place.10 2 Such reassertion through, the back door, of the execu-
tive's preeminence in the foreign policy field where legitimate
justiciable issues are present is reminiscent of the previous
"Tate Letter" practices, which, it is widely assumed, passed
Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 64-75 (1981).
100. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 701, 702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Section 702 states:
§ 702. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it prac-
tices, encourages, or condones
(a)genocide,
(b)slavery or slave trade,
(c)the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d)torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e)prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f)systematic racial discrimination, or
(g)a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.
102. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappis,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); see also ]panco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 419-20 (1964).
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from the scene with the enactment of the FSIA. Thus, the po-
tential exists for a revitalized use of the act of state doctrine in
the United States, whereby a particular political question, sepa-
ration of powers or foreign policy issue may be seized upon by a
state at any stage of proceedings against it to deny justiciability
of a claim.
Nonetheless, the possibility of the doctrine being applied in
human rights cases is still very real, as the Liu case reveals.10 3
The district court opinion in the case of Liu v. Republic of
China is an example of the executive branch seeking to claw
back, by means of the act of state doctrine, any perceived lost
power in the decision making as to whether or not sovereign
states may be sued in the courts of the United States. It was the
first time in this century that a court applied this judge-made
foreign relations legal doctrine in such a blatant way to shield a
foreign state from having to defend itself against liability claims
for personal injury or death which occurred on United States
soil.104 The Liu case, like the Letelier case before it, was essen-
tially an action for wrongful death. It appears to be unique in
this respect since most other acts in which the act of state doc-
trine has been applied dealt with nationalization or expropria-
tion of property by a state or with other types of commercial
transactions.105
Henry Liu was a journalist who left Taiwan in 1967 and set-
tled in the United States. His ongoing writings were critical of
the Taiwanese Government, and at the time of his death he was
preparing to publish two books that reportedly would have
caused the government serious embarrassment. On October 15,
1984, he was shot to death by two gunmen at his home. A
Taiwanese court found the director and several subordinates of
Taiwan's Defence Intelligence Bureau guilty of conspiring to
murder Liu, but also found that this plot was kept secret from
103. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986), 892 F.2d 1419 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 27 (1990).
104. Liu, 642 F. Supp. at 300-03.
105. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1278 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappis, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
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the director's supervisors in the government. The Taiwanese
court thus determined that the perpetrators had acted as indi-
viduals without the knowledge of any senior officials. One of the
assassins refuted this story and asserted at his trial that he was
persuaded by high ranking government officials that the assassi-
nation of Liu would be a patriotic act and a great contribution
to his country. After the murder, he said he was greeted and
praised by senior officials. He categorically stated that the mur-
der was an act of the Government of Taiwan.
In the United States, the court denied the plaintiff widow's
complaint and dismissed the case against the defendant Govern-
ment, applying the act of state doctrine. The act of state was not
the assassination, but rather the ruling of the Taiwanese court
that absolved the Taiwanese Government of liability. Plaintiff's
case was clearly aimed at having declared invalid the findings of
the foreign court which the court regarded, because of its seri-
ousness, as effectively an act of state and not a routine
adjudication.
This court ruling stood United States' law on sovereign im-
munity on its head. Acts of state apply to acts of general appli-
cability by legislatures and executives of a state whereby policy
is made. Never before has the doctrine been applied to a ruling
of a foreign court.106 In any event, the very definition of the act
of state set out in UnderhillJ 0 7 restricts the legal pronounce-
ments of the Taiwanese Court as a legal finding in that country.
It is in no way binding upon or even by comity restrictive of the
Liu widow in her United States action. The lower court's ruling
in the Liu case also directly contravenes section 1605(a)(5) of
the FSIA discussed above, which explicitly provides for United
States Court jurisdiction over foreign states in such cases.108
The act of state doctrine had therefore become a means to
allow the "Bernstein exception" or "Tate Letter" control by the
executive to re-enter through the back door, emasculating what
little progress has been made through the enactment of the
FSIA. Around the time of enactment of the statute in 1976, Con-
gress itself raised this spectre and called for judicial vigilance to
106. Liu v. Republic of China, No. C-85-7461 EFL, 1987 WL 49413 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 1987).
107. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
108. Liu v. Republic of China, No. C-85-7461 EFL, 1987 WL 49413 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 1987).
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prevent this from occurring.'09 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA and that Califor-
nia, as the place of the murder, had a relationship with the tort
at least as significant as that of the Republic of China, and ac-
cordingly, California's law of respondeat superior applied.110 As
to the act of state doctrine, the court further held that while
there may be particular instances where the FSIA will confer ju-
risdiction and yet the act of state doctrine will mandate judicial
abstention, this was not one of those cases."' By implication
from the court's reasoning, neither would any such bar be ap-
plied if there was a consensus in international law in respect of
condemnation for the wrongful acts." 2
Even more significant was the Ninth Circuit's en banc rul-
ing in Trajano v. Marcos,"' overturning a district court ruling
that sustained an act of state defense in an action by torture
victims against Ferdinand E. Marcos for acts committed in the
Philippines while he was President. In Trajano the Ninth Cir-
cuit extended the principles in the Liu case to include acts com-
mitted by a leader of a foreign state against its own citizens
within its own territory. Trajano specifically was the consoli-
dated appeal of five cases that alleged that Marcos and others
tortured, kidnapped and imprisoned plaintiffs and killed their
decedents in violation of municipal and international law." 4
Though restricted as to precedential use and limited to the
facts of the case, Trajano, for the first time, affirmed the right
of foreign victims to bring actions and seek relief against their
own leaders under section 1350.11, This is the first appellate
court to have endorsed the use of the courts of the United States
by such victims who otherwise have nowhere else to go. It is a
natural progression from the Second Circuit's ruling in Filartiga.
109. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 n.1 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
110. Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
111. Id. at 1432.
112. Id. at 1433.
113. No. 86-2448 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1986) (unpublished).
114. Id.
115. See Steven M. Schneebaum, Yes: Freedom From Torture is a Legal Right, 76
A.B.A. J. 34 (1990).
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D. Sovereign Immunity in Other States
The status of sovereign immunity as it is reflected in the
municipal law of the three states discussed in this article is
largely representative of comparable laws enacted by other ma-
jor world states. Either in principle or as a result of legislation or
judicial decisions, some thirty-eight states have embraced the
concept of restrictive immunity.1 16 However, while there is a def-
inite trend toward restrictive immunity by contemporary state
governments, a number have yet to clarify their position. In ad-
dition, at least sixteen states still accept the principle of abso-
lute immunity unless the offending state consents to
jurisdiction. 1 7
Nearly all of the more recent codifications of state immu-
nity withdraw immunity for those acts of foreign states which
cause death or injury (a notable exception is the Pakistan State
Immunity Ordinance)."" However, the most limiting common
characteristic of the new statutes which include the torts excep-
tion is the requirement that the tort complained of must be
committed inside the forum state."" The FSIA differs slightly in
this regard in that it simply refers to the resulting damage as
". . occurring in the United States."' 20 Consequently, the stat-
utes tend to be much more restrictive of state immunity in the
determination of whether the act in question was public or pri-
vate, reflecting the traditional considerations of jure gestionis
and jure imperii, and they also tend to be much more limiting of
jurisdiction in respect of the locus commissi of the illegal act.12
Thus, even if human rights violations were exceptions to ex-
isting statutory sovereign immunity protections, there would re-
main the requirement that the act be committed in the forum
state. The more recent torts exception to sovereign immunity is
indeed an improvement, as is the general movement away from a
structural approach, where the relationship of the entity to the
state is the focus, to a consideration of the actual function being
performed. German practice, for example, has to date categori-
116. See BROWNLEE, supra note 2, at 320.
117. See BROWNLE, supra note 2, at 320.
118. See Pakistan, State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 reprinted in Materials on Juris-
diction Immunities of States and their Property 28, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20
(1982).
119. See cases cited in 65 I.L.R. (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1984).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
121. See supra note 119.
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cally been that separate legal entities of a foreign state (separate
judicial persons) are distinct from the state itself and enjoy no
immunity,122 whereas the French, with some exceptions, hold
that the identity or structure is irrelevant and immunity is
based on the nature of the activity and not the status of the
acting entity.123 The views of the other European states tend to
be less clear, though by and large the courts seem to be moving
in the direction of determining state immunity on the basis of
particular acts and not the entities involved.1 2
4
Though there is an undeniable trend away from absolute
immunity from execution, unfortunately, at the present time the
possibility of the enforcement of tort or noncommercial judg-
ments against states is, for the most part, as severely restricted
throughout the rest of the world as it is by statute in the United
States and the United Kingdom. For instance, the European
Convention on State Immunity generally prohibits any enforce-
ment measures absent an express waiver,"2" but also requires
member states to abide by final judgments against them which
are arrived at in accordance with conventions, restrictions as to
jurisdiction and certain other safeguards. 26 A special proceeding
may also be initiated before the European Tribunal of State
Immunity.127
A number of states, in particular Greece1 28 and Italy, 29
strictly adhere to the requirement of executive authorization be-
122. Central Bank of Nigeria Case, 65 I.L.R. 131 (Provincial Ct. of Frankfurt 1976).
123. Administration de Chemins de Fer du Government Iranien v. Soci~t6 Le Vant
Express Transport, 52 I.L.R. 315 (Ct. of Cassation 1969) (Fr.); see also Renfe v. Cavaille,
65 I.L.R. 41 (Montpelier Court of Appeal 1968) (Fr.).
124. Banco de la Nacion, Lima v. Banca Cattolica del Veneto, BGE 110 Ia 43 (1984)
(Switz.); Societe Anonyme "Dhlellemes et Masurel" v. Banque Centrale de la Republique
du Turquie, 45 I.L.R. 85 (Ct. App. 1972) (Belg.); Hungarian Papal Institute v. Hungarian
Institute (Academy) in Rome, 40 I.L.R. 59 (Cour De Cassation 1960) (Italy); Consorio
Agrario Della Tripolitania v. Federazione Italiana Consorziagrai and Cassa Di Ris-
parmio Della Libia, 65 I.L.R. 265 (Ct. of Cassation 1966) (Italy); NV Exploitatie-Maat-
schappi, Bengkalis v. Bank of Indonesia, 65 I.L.R. 348 (Ct. App. 1984) (Neth.); N.V.
Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co., 47 I.L.R. 138 (Dist. Ct. of The Hague 1968); Caisse
d'Assurance Vieillesse des Non-Salaries v. Caisse Nationale des Barreaux Francais, 65
I.L.R. 70 (Ct. of Cassation) (Fr.).
125. European Convention of State Immunity, May 22, 1985, art. 23, Europ. T.S.
No. 74.
126. Id. art. 20.
127. Id. art. 23.
128. Sale of British Embassy Building Case, 65 I.L.R. 247 (Ct. of Cassation 1962)
(Greece).
129. Prefect of Milan v. Federici and Savoldi, 65 I.L.R. 270, 271 (Ct. of Cassation
1968) (Italy).
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ing obtained prior to any enforcement measures against foreign
states. This obviously poses a serious threat to the functioning
of an independent judiciary.
The largest number of states, illogically in my view, treat
the question of enforcement as an issue distinct from jurisdic-
tional immunity, with a tendency to allow enforcement with re-
gard to commercial property but to deny or prohibit it if the
assets appear to be used for public or state purposes. This is
reflected in comments and decisions of the courts in Austria, 130
Germany, 3' France,3 2 Belgium,'3 3 and the Netherlands. 3
Switzerland, on the other hand, has consistently held that
execution is a logical consequence of jurisdiction.13 5 Swiss prac-
tice will, however, not accept jurisdiction over a state solely be-
cause there are assets of that state in the country, and Swiss
practice is clearly to permit execution only of property and as-
sets not designated for official or public use."" It is clear that
even if enforcement immunity is overcome in a particular in-
stance in principle, then an analysis of the use of the available
state-related assets is necessary in almost every case in order to
determine whether sovereign (state) or commercial (private)
functions are being financed.' 37
The potential, then, for victims such as those in Kuwait and
Kurdistan to recover compensation for wrongful deaths and
massive criminal injuries under existing state immunity statutes,
130. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, State Immunity: Austria, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 97,
106 (1979).
131. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, State Immunity: Federal Republic of Germany, 10
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 55, 66 (1979).
132. Jan-Anders Paulsson, Sovereign Immunity from Execution in France, 11 INT'L
LAW. 673 (1977).
133. Joe Verhoeven, Immunity from Execution of Foreign States in Belgium Law,
10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 73 (1979).
134. C.C.A. Voskvil, The International Law of State Immunity, as Reflected in the
Dutch Civil Law of Execution, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 245 (1979).
135. Griechenland v. Julius Bar, BGE 82 Ia 75 (1956) (Switz.); United Arab Repub-
lic v. Mrs. X, BGE 86 Ia 23 (1960) (Switz.); Banque Centrale de la Republique de Tur-
quie v. Weston Compagnie de Finance et d'Investissement SA, BGE 104 Ia 367 (1978)
(Switz.); Banque Commerciale Aabe SA, 65 I.L.R. 412 (Fed. Trib. 1984) (Switz.); Banco
de la Nacion (Lima) v. Banca cattolica del Veneto (Vicenza), BGE 110 Ia 43 (1984)
(Switz.); Republique de Guinee v. M., 42 Schw JIR 69 (1986); Italien g. X., BGE 111 Ia
52, (1985) (Switz.).
136. See Jean-Flavien Lalive, Swiss Law and Practice in relation to Measures of
Execution Against the Property of a Foreign State, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 153, 165
(1979).
137. Id.
1992]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
procedures and interpretations of law appears to be minimal.
IV. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY To VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE BASIC NORMS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
- THE Jus Cogens
A. The Prevailing View
Current national court systems and their presiding judges
clearly wish to avert their eyes to violations by sovereign states
of established customary international law concerning human
rights. In the present context, if the United States does not lead
the way in effecting a change in judicial policy and FSIA statu-
tory interpretation, or if new international civilian and criminal
courts are not established to adjudicate individual claims in
cases of state sponsored injury, torture and death, then individ-
ual Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims will be deprived of not only a
remedy - as in Letelier - but even a cause of action. 138
What can one say in defense of the quality of law in modern
nations whose values are represented by legal systems which al-
low sovereign states to be called to the bar of justice and be ac-
countable for their commercial misdeeds and breaches of con-
tract and yet allow them to totally avoid responsibility for the
most grievous crimes against individual victims. The argument
here is that given the history of the development of customary
international law on this issue and the existing treaty and statu-
tory language which has evolved, this should not be the case and
that judicial interpretations to the contrary are bad law and
should be overturned. Though international tribunals should in
the long term be established to adjudicate these acts, in the
short term there is ample existing authority for states to under-
take universal jurisdiction and make available their municipal
courts and legal systems for the litigation of claims based on vio-
lations of those international rules of conduct which have come
to be part of the jus cogens. The following parts of this article
discuss the formulation of this approach in accordance with in-
ternational law and the authority for the assumption of this role
by municipal systems of law.
B. .The Growth of the Body of International Law
That corpus of law which is currently regarded as "interna-
138. See supra note 1.
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tional" consists of a vast array of substantive material. It covers
an enormous range of subject matters from maritime trade and
the law of the sea, to space exploration, aviation, the allocation
of broadcasting frequencies and the conduct of war and diplo-
macy. This article is concerned with that aspect of international
law which deals with acts and omissions of such a grievous na-
ture that the conduct may no longer be regarded as civil wrongs,
but as contravening the jus cogens norms or fundamental princi-
ples of law. There is international acceptance of the concept that
human rights violations contravene customary international law,
though less than unanimity as to its evolving content. Over time,
such abhorrent conduct has come to be universally acknowl-
edged as constituting the most serious of crimes, the prohibition
of which is not only universally accepted as a fundamental part
of the customary law of nations, but also is explicitly embodied
in a variety of multinational treaties and covenants. The protec-
tion in international law of the most fundamental individual
rights is then clearly embodied in the concept of jus cogens.
Consequently, state acts involving torture (including rape), ge-
nocide, political assassination, hostage taking, and indiscrimi-
nate murder and forced disappearance of civilians are all
included.
These jus cogens norms of behavior, protections and
prohibitions are so fundamental that they do not rely on a
state's consent for it to be bound; neither can a state derogate
from its duty to act accordingly.139 International treaties, con-
ventions, agreements and declarations may be indications of af-
firmative state action but in fact and in law no explicit consent
is or should be required for a state to be bound; the very fact
that the actor is a state implies acceptance and when a state
violates such a norm or principle it is not entitled to immunity.
State immunity rests upon the principle that states cannot be
bound by any aspect of international law without their consent,
but the jus cogens is a set of peremptory norms which does not
depend on any state's consent for its validity. Its very existence
139. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 54 (9th ed. 1984);
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1953); L.C.
Green, Canadian Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 217, 224-25 (1988); Egon Schwelb, The Actio Popularis and International Law, 2 ISR.
Y.B. H.R. 46, 56 (1972); H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 397-98 (1950).
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and emergence in importance takes precedence over the individ-
ual wills of states and suggests that the traditional concept of
state sovereignty is inconsistent and outmoded in modern times.
The modern evaluation of international society as an organized
and integrated community of states is incompatible with the
earlier positivist notion that sovereignty implies unlimited
power.
Historically, states have assumed jurisdiction over civil liti-
gation as well as criminal investigations or prosecutions where
the acts involved were alleged to have been committed, or at
least the effects of the illegal acts were felt, in their own terri-
tory. This rule and practice derived from the doctrine of na-
tional sovereignty which respected the right of states to adminis-
ter and enforce their own systems of law. With the expansion of
the catalogue of acts covered by jus cogens and the list of "inter-
national crimes" gradually increasing from the time of the initial
agreement concerning piracy, it was inevitable that municipal
courts would extend their jurisdiction in the continued absence
of any permanent international tribunal having jurisdiction.
Consequently, since the second half of the nineteenth century it
has been generally acknowledged that international law imposes
criminal responsibility on individuals as well as upon states, and
for which punishment may be imposed, either by properly em-
powered international tribunals, military tribunals or municipal
courts.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the Nu-
remberg Charter) annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, signed on August 8, 1945, provides in article 6 that:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be indi-
vidual responsibility:
(a) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assur-
ances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing:
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or cus-
toms of war...
(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or reli-
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gious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
In its judgment the Tribunal Stated:
[The fact] that international law imposes duties and liabilities
upon individuals as upon States has long been recognized....
[T]he very essence of the Charter is that individuals have in-
ternational duties which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates
the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursu-
ance of the authority of the State, if the State in action moves
outside its competence under international law.140
The Agreement [annexed to the Charter of the Tribunal]
was signed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There is no question that
article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter has ever since been part of
and represented customary international law. At the time, the
trial was a precedent setting event, with the exception of the
ultimately ignored provisions of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles in
respect of the German Emperor, for state officials had never
been held personally responsible for their illegal acts. For the
first time, the principle was established that if any representa-
tives of a state were ever faced with the choice of complying
with the legal requirements of their states or international laws,
then they had better opt for the latter or risk being held person-
ally accountable and liable for their acts. The very essence of the
rulings at Nuremberg was, and remains today, the principle that
individuals as well as states have international duties which
transcend obligations of obedience imposed by their municipal
law.
The next step in the development of an agreed body of in-
ternational human rights law was the adoption of the Charter
adopted in San Francisco on June 26, 1945. This followed natu-
rally from the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference attended by
twenty-six allied nations which proposed the establishment of
an organization designed, among other things, to promote re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Charter
thus became the first multinational treaty to deal with the entire
140. See BROWNLEE, supra note 2, at 545.
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spectrum of human rights and to recognize this obligation as be-
ing no longer the exclusive concern of individual states but a
legitimate issue of the whole international community.
Article 56 of the Charter explicitly states that all of the
members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the U.N. in order to accomplish the obligations
of the Charter.
The Charter did not, however, specifically define the human
rights and fundamental freedoms being guaranteed, protected
and ensured. This was done by resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly some three years later on December 10, 1948, through
the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (the
Universal Declaration). The adoption was by a vote of the then
fifty-six members with forty-eight in favor, eight abstaining and
none against.141
Since its adoption, the Universal Declaration has stood as
the first detailed catalogue of human rights and fundamental
freedoms to be formally recognized by the international commu-
nity of sovereign states. By 1991, a generation later, there should
be little doubt that both the Charter - the status of which in
international law has never been in doubt - and the Universal
Declaration should be regarded as part of customary interna-
tional law. Any doubt as to this status may be dispelled by
awareness of the following:1 42 one, between 1958 and 1972 alone,
references to the Universal Declaration were included in twenty-
five new national constitutions and eight domestic legislative
acts; and two, its provisions have been invoked on countless oc-
casions by international institutions, including the ICJ, and a
considerable number of international legal scholars.
For instance, at the U.N. International Conference on
Human Rights in Teheran between April 22 and May 13, 1968,
attended by eighty-four nations, a Proclamation was issued
141. The abstentions were cast by Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Ara-
bia, South Africa, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. PAUL
SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (1983).
142. Oscar Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Poli-
cies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63 (1978). Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitu-
tion: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643 (1951); V.
Voitto Saario & Rosemary Higgins Cass, The United Nations and the International
Protection of Human Rights: A Legal Analysis and Interpretation, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
591, 596 (1977); John P. Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human
Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 31, 32 (1978); PAUL SErGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 54 (1983).
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which confirmed the status of the Universal Declaration as an
obligation for the member states, therefore assuring its status as
a part of customary international law. The Proclamation con-
tained the following clause: "2. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states a common understanding of the peoples of
the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all
members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community."
In addition, Iraq (though not the United States) became a
member of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights on January 25, 1971 (the Covenant entered into force on
March 23, 1976) and its provisions are generally considered as
part of customary international law.
Article 6 provides that:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life .... No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes commit-
ted by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be
carried out on pregnant women.
Article 7 provides that:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment ....
Article 10 requires that:
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.
Customary international law in respect of the treatment of
property and persons in occupied territory is also similarly em-
bodied and detailed in the Hague Regulations - Hague Conven-
tion IV, 1907 (Hague IV) and the Fourth Geneva Convention
1949 (Fourth Geneva). 43 Finally, the Iraqi Civil Law no. 40 (the
143. Article 43 of the Hague Convention IV provides that, the authority of the legit-
imate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. See
Hague Convention IV, supra note 44.
Article 46 requires that family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected and further
that private property cannot be confiscated.
In Article 47, pillage is formally forbidden.
Hague IV, Article 50 states that no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be
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Law) enacted in 1951 provides that all matters are to be deter-
inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot
be regarded as jointly and severally responsible and Article 55 states that the occupying
State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real
estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the
occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them
in accordance with the rules of usufruct.
Finally, Article 56 provides that the property of municipalities, that of institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the art and sciences, even when State prop-
erty, shall be treated as private property and that all seizure of, destruction or wilful
damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and sci-
ence, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.
The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) (Fourth Geneva) regulates the treatment of
civilian persons in times of armed'conflict. At the time of the Iraq invasion (August 2,
1990) 166 states including Iraq, the United States and Kuwait were parties to the
Convention.
It provides that civilians as "protected persons" are entitled to humane treatment
and to be protected against all acts of violence. Women are to be especially protected
against rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent assault (art. 27).
No physical or moral coercion is to be used in efforts to obtain information, and
hostage taking and indiscriminate and collective punishment is prohibited (arts. 31-34).
The Occupying Power, as Iraq was for over six months, is required to the fullest
extent possible to maintain health care and hospital facilities, and the material and
stores of the civilian hospitals, required for the civilian needs may not be requisitioned
(art. 57).
Article 75 provides that in no instance where a person is condemned to death shall
such person be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve nor shall the
sentence be carried out before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of
the final judgment.
Articles 146-147 of the Fourth Geneva convey jurisdiction in the courts of each Con-
tracting Party in respect of the prosecution of violations of the provisions of the Conven-
tion and each party undertakes to enact any legislation necessary to effect penal sanc-
tions against those responsible for any of the offenses summarized in Article 147 as "...
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment. . .wilfully causing great suffering or seri-
ous injury to body or health ... .wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of
fair and regular trial . . . extensive destruction and appropriation of property . ., car-
ried out unlawfully and wantonly."
Fourth Geneva contains provisions concerning the repression of abuses and infrac-
tions which obligate the parties to the following:
1. "to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to committed" what are called "grave breaches" of the Conven-
tion - violations involving "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including bio-
logical experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
.. .and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;"
2. "to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches" and to "bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts" or to "hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned;" and
3. to "take measures necessary for the suppression" of violations of the Convention that
do not amount to "grave breaches."
As with the Hague Conventions, violations are punishable under United States law
by military courts under jurisdiction conferred by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
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mined by applying the written law of the Civil Code, except
when no provision is available, and then justice shall be adminis-
tered by the courts according to custom, the Islamic Code or ul-
timately according to the ". . . general principles of justice."
This provision appears to be a direct reference to and incorpora-
tion of the jus cogens. The Iraqi law also provides that ". . the
courts shall be guided in all matters of principle by solutions
adopted by judicial decisions and writers in Iraq and in other
countries, the laws of which are similar to Iraqi law."
It is next necessary to assess the relationship between this
developed body of international law and municipal law as it re-
lates to the obligations of states.
C. The Relationship Between International Law'and the Mu-
nicipal Law Concerning the Obligations of States
As to the relationship of international law to municipal law,
international lawyers are generally split into dualists or monists
or some variation thereof. Considering the existing nuances and
variations, it is not always helpful to classify the issues in these
two terms, however, the basic positions must nonetheless be
noted.
By way of summary, dualists traditionally focus on what
they regard as the essential difference between the two systems.
They view international law as that system of laws which regu-
lates relations between states, while municipal law is seen as ap-
plying only within states, regulating the relations among citizens
and their government. This view holds that neither legal order
has the power to create or amend the rules of the other and that
if a state provides that international law applies in its jurisdic-
tion, this is merely an exercise of its municipal law. In the event
of a conflict, the dualist would expect that a municipal court
would apply municipal law.
Monists regard this approach as effectively denying the re-
ality of international law to most of the peoples of the world,
with the absence of a superior legal order leaving them and the
rule of law hostage to the spectacle of nearly two hundred sover-
eign states, each claiming to be the highest authority of law
within its national territory. Monists argue that if certain stan-
dards of conduct are accepted as the norm, then this type of
(10 U.S.C. § 818, 821 (1956)).
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universal basic norm should be binding upon all states and en-
forceable in and by their municipal courts.
One would have thought that the question has been settled
as to the relationship between the two types of law. A state can-
not assert provisions or deficiencies of its own law as a defense
to a claim against it for an alleged breach of its obligations
under international law."" It would also appear that nations
have a general duty to bring their municipal law into conformity
with customary international law and their various treaty obliga-
tions.'45 A direct breach of international law occurs when a state
fails to observe its obligations on a particular occasion and not,
generally, because it fails to take the necessary steps to conform
its municipal law to prevailing international law. A growing
number of states expressly accept international law as a part of
their municipal law. 46 Where this is the case, the international
law provisions are "self-executing" and the rights are directly
enforceable. The Constitution of the United States (article VI
sec. 2), for example, includes international treaties which bind
the United States as not only being part of United States law
but to be regarded as ". . . the supreme Law of the land."
Other countries such as France 47 and the Federal Republic
of Germany'48 assign to such obligations of international law a
place and rank superior to all prior and subsequent domestic
legislation. An ever increasing number of states are enacting
constitutional provisions requiring that all municipal laws con-
form to customary international law. Article 10 of the 1947 Ital-
ian Constitution is exemplary in this respect.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, as a dualist state,
generally requires that Parliament enact specific legislation for
any provisions of international law in order for it to be consid-
ered as part of the municipal law. In practice, however, such
provisions of law are incorporated in United Kingdom law and
enforced to the extent that they are not inconsistent with Acts
144. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
145. See BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 38.
146. E.g., Argentina, Austria, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, Germany,
Spain, Netherlands, Switzerland, United States, USSR and Mexico. See BROWNLIE,
supra note 2, at 52 n.3.
147. CONST. art. 55.
148. Basic Law of May 8, 1949, as amended on Jan. 1, 1966, art. 25 (F.R.G.).
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of Parliament or prior judicial decisions and stare decisis. 49
Difficulties arise in instances where the acts or omissions
complained of, like those suffered by the Kuwaiti and Kurdish
victims, (1) occur outside of the national territory being asked to
assume jurisdiction; (2) occur inside a state, being committed
against the offending state's own people in violation of both the
state's municipal law and international law, requiring external
intervention, as in the case of the Kurds; and/or, (3) are commit-
ted by a state under a claim of jure imperii or ratione materiae.
Consequently, it is necessary next to analyze the applicability of
the relevant jus cogens aspects of customary international law
and treaty provisions to Iraq's aggression in Kuwait and
Kurdistan.
D. The Applicability of the Relevant Jus Cogens Norms of
Customary International Law and Treaty Provisions to the
Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait and the Aggression Against the
Kurds
The factual setting to consider in determining whether Iraq
violated customary international laws is as follows: some sixteen
formal letters from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to
the United Nations Secretary-General between August 5, 1990
and November 28, 1990 contained numerous allegations of
human rights violations;15 0 it is evident that during the months
of March and April 1991 units totalling some five divisions of
the Iraqi army descended on each and every Kurdish occupied
city, town and village, backed by tanks and helicopter gunships,
and randomly slaughtered any civilian men, women and children
who were unable to flee; Iraq and the United States have mutu-
ally signed and agreed to be bound by and obligated under the
149. See BROWNLE, supra note 2, at 45.
150. 1. Summary execution of civilian men, women and children; 2. individual and
gang rapes of girls and women; 3. torture of every conceivable kind; 4. dismemberment of
human bodies, including decapitation and castration; 5. desecration of human remains; 6.
use of hospital facilities for purposes of torture; 7. immolation of human beings; 8. ran-
dom beatings of the population; 9. confiscation of private and personal property; 10.
theft of all kinds of public equipment; 11. group executions, and mass burials; 12. ran-
dom looting and pillage; 13. theft of livestock and 200 other animals; 14. kidnapping,
deportation to Iraq of large numbers of individuals, presumably for hostage purposes; 15.
transportation of large numbers of Iraqi families to Kuwait for the purpose of their occu-
pying the former residences of Kuwaitis; 16. random burning of buildings and homes and
desecration of places of worship. THE KUWAIT CRisis: BASIC DOCUMENTS 267-276 (Elihu
Lauterpacht et al. eds., 1991).
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terms of the Charter, the Universal Declaration and the Geneva
Fourth concerning the treatment of civilians in times of armed
conflict; the Nuremberg Charter and the Hague Convention IV,
concerning the treatment of property and persons, have by now
become part of international customary law and thus binding on
all nations of the international community; Iraq has acceded to
and agreed to be bound by the articles of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights; and Iraq's own Civil Law no.
40 ultimately looks to the ". . . general principles of justice
S. ." in respect of determining the legality of "... all matters
and acts.
Iraq's singling out of the Kurds constitutes a clear violation
of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) to which Iraq
acceded on January 20, 1959, and which has also been ratified
and acceded to by the United States and eighty-four other
states." 1 The Genocide Convention is now incorporated into and
151. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,
HAVING CONSIDERED the declaration made by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its resolution 96(I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is
a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations and condemned by the civilized world; . . .
HEREBY AGREE AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they under-
take to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts commit-
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; ...
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and publib incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide
Article IV
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials, or private individuals.
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implemented by United States law (18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093)
which was enacted pursuant to the Genocide Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988 in which forms of genocide which involve
actual killing are punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of
not more than 1 million dollars, other forms of genocide by not
more than twenty years imprisonment, and/or a fine of 1 million
dollars and incitement to genocide by not more than five years
imprisonment and/or a fine of 500,000 dollars.
It is indisputable that Iraq has committed grave breaches
and violations of its explicit international treaty and covenant
obligations, as well as of the jus cogens.
E. The Imputability and Responsibility of Iraq Under Inter-
national Law
There is a possibility, however, that Iraq could pass off state
responsibility and liability to the individual soldiers, intelligence
interrogators and other governmental, military and Baath Party
officials who were the direct perpetrators of the illegal acts.
Since individuals are often made the scapegoats for criminal acts
of the states they serve, it is necessary to examine this issue.
Imputability - the basic notion in the concept of state re-
sponsibility - is the juridical attribution of a particular act or
acts by persons, or a group of persons to a state whereby it is
regarded as the act of the state itself. When unlawful acts in
international law are imputable to a state, responsibility or lia-
bility arises immediately at the time of commission.152
There can no longer be any question that the state is a per-
son in law. The state is a juridical person with responsibility for
the acts of its officers in the exercise of public authority. The
state has responsibility for damages caused to foreigners, for
which it can be held bound to indemnify for any damage and
loss caused by its agents. 53 In fact, states can obviously only act
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respec-
tive Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of
the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in Article III
152. Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.) 1952 I.C.J. 28 (July 1).
153. de Brissot Case (U.S. v. Venez.), 3 Int. Arb. 2949, 2952-53 (1885); see also BIN
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBU-
NALS 181 (1987).
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through their agents, officials and representatives.","
Iraq, then, like every other state, is the aggregate of all of its
citizens and its officials, but it can only act through its govern-
ment and the officials and representatives thereof. So, the im-
putability of governmental acts to the state is derived from the
imputability of the acts of its officials, agents and representa-
tives, of whatever rank.1 55 Further, there can be no question that
the Iraqi officials and armed forces who waged aggressive war
and occupation against Kuwait, as well as the genocidal opera-
tions against the Kurds, were acting on behalf of the Govern-
ment of Iraq. Hence, responsibility is imputed to the State of
Iraq as well as to the particular individuals involved for the
criminal acts.
Numerous tribunals and rulings have upheld this dual lia-
bility in similar cases. 156
Indeed, as to state liability, when an official - of whatever
rank or position - acts in his or.her official capacity, such acts
are imputable to the state irrespective of whether he has acted
in error' 57 or without authorization. 158 Neither may the imputa-
bility to the state of acts of violence by its armed forces be less-
ened by the fact that such acts are in violation of the municipal
law.
In the Youmans case (1926), ten Mexican soldiers sent to
protect some Americans at Angangueo against mob violence in-
stead participated in committing acts of violence against the vic-
tims. The Mexican-United States General Claims Commission
(1923) held that these acts could not be regarded as acts com-
mitted in their private capacity when it was clear that the per-
petrators were on duty and under the immediate supervision of
a commanding officer. 59 The Commission stated that:
... Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or committing wanton
destruction or looting always act in disobedience of some supe-
rior authority. There could be no liability whatever for such
misdeeds if the view were taken that any acts committed by
154. Advisory Opinion No. 6, German Settlers in Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
6, at 22, Adv. op. B6, 22. See ICJ.Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
155. See CHENG, supra note 153, at 184.
156. See CHENG, supra note 153, at 189, 197.
157. See CHENG, supra note 153, at 202.
158. See CHENG, supra note 153, at 202.
159. CHENG, supra note 153, at 202.
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soldiers in contravention of instructions must always be con-
sidered as personal acts. 60
The Commission thus clearly regarded the acts of these
soldiers as acts of the government and as such imputable to the
state. It must be so; otherwise, a state could by its municipal law
provide that none of its officials should be competent to perform
an act which contravenes an international obligation of the state
and thus deny the imputability to it of any such illegal acts or
conduct on the part of its officials or representatives. As noted in
the summary conclusion on this point by Bin Cheng in his work
General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts
and Tribunals:' "Municipal law as such, therefore, has no op-
erative effect in international law and, in consequence, imputa-
bility in international law should not be governed, and need not
be justified, by provisions of municipal law.' 1 62
F. Historical Precedents For Restricting Sovereign Immunity
and Intervention In Instances of State Violations of Interna-
tional Law
As early as the nineteenth century, there developed in inter-
national law a doctrine of legitimacy for the limitation and de-
nial of sovereign immunity in instances of clear violations of the
developing jus cogens where, such as in the Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, an aggressive state committed acts which
shocked the conscience of humankind. The protective cloak of
state immunity has also come to be denied in respect of conduct
like the Kurdish massacres where the acts took place on the of-
fending state's own territory against its own subjects. This was
settled long before the 1951 date of effect of the Genocide
Convention.
The hollow, plaintive pleas of there being "no authority" for
intervention in Iraq's internal affairs, which emanated from
nearly all of the coalition allies, is ludicrous if not Kafkaesque in
light of the plain meaning of the U.N. Convention and the rele-
vant historical precedents. Numerous examples illustrate the
"authority" to intervene:
1. Such considerations have never before prevented the United
160. CHENG, supra note 153, at 203.
161. CHENG, supra note 153, at 207.
162. CHENG, supra note 153, at 207.
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States from intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign
states and even assisting in changes of government when it was
perceived to be - however wrongly - in the political interests
of the United States. Among others, the following United
States government forays spring readily to mind: Guatemala
(1954); Iran (1954-55); Cuba; Dominican Republic; Chile (Al-
lende); Nicaragua (covert); Panama; Grenada; the Congo
(Katanga); Indonesia (Sukarno); and Australia (for the demise
of Gough Whitlam). Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, the non-
intervention clause, now frequently cited, was certainly not a
consideration in these and many other instances of United
States intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
2. Following the First World War, the League of Nations guar-
anteed treaties designed to protect the rights of linguistic and
ethnic minorities residing in the new territories created by the
Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.1 63
3. The German-Polish Convention of May 15, 1922 in respect
of Upper Silesia provided for access by individual claimants to
the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal and over 4,000 cases were
filed.1 64
4. France had much earlier invoked this principle in 1827 on
behalf of the Greek people and again in 1860-66 in Syria. The
massacre of some 12,000 Christian civilians by irregular. Otto-
man troops in 1876 again provided a basis for the denial of
sovereign immunity to the Ottoman State.
The intrusion into a state's internal affairs may also be seen in
the international collaboration which has resulted in the prohi-
bition of the authority of individual states to legalize slavery as
well as a number of other protections and prohibited national
acts contained in the Hague and later the Geneva Conventions.
In each instance, state immunity has given way not to the rights
of states against other states but to the legitimate assertion of
the rights of specific individuals against sovereign states.
In light then of the Genocide Convention, the fact and gen-
erally accepted legitimacy of these interventions beginning over
160 years ago, and the more recent activities of the United
States, it is impossible for the allies, and in particular the
United States, to justify standing by while fully mobilized, thus
passively collaborating in clear violation of their own obligations
163. See, e.g., German-Polish Convention Relating to Upper Silesia, May 15, 1922,
in ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 67
(1991) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT].
164. Id.
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under international law. Consequently, even in light of practice
under article 2(7) of the Charter, there has undeniably emerged
a situation whereby a range of international precedents, agree-
ments, treaties and covenants exist, some of which have been
acceded to and are binding upon sovereign states such as Iraq,
and which define, create and seek to protect specific rights for
individuals who are not themselves parties to the agreements. 65
It is generally recognized in law that for every right there
must be a correlative duty imposed on someone other than the
holder of the right - here the relevant state - and a remedy
which is attached to the right and which flows from its violation.
The existence of a right without this correlative duty and rem-
edy renders the right itself meaningless and effectively nonexis-
tent. The most basic of these protected jus cogens rights are
properly called human rights. They are not acquired, nor can
they be transferred, disposed of or extinguished by any sover-
eign act or event. They belong to each human being for the en-
tirety of his or her life. They are truly inalienable and the correl-
ative duties and remedies required for their existence fall
primarily upon sovereign states, their public authorities, agen-
cies and officials. Thus, signatory states to these various treaties,
covenants and agreements, such as Iraq and the United States,
as well as the community of nations in respect of customary in-
ternational law, have clear obligations not only to restrict and
regulate their own use of power and force upon their own citi-
zens but also to respond to those situations and acts occurring
beyond their national boundaries where illegal acts are commit-
ted in violation of the human rights of the citizens of other
states.
In short, there must be some procedure whereby the indi-
vidual victims of the criminal acts such as those perpetrated by
Iraq in the invasion and occupation of Kuwait and upon its own
Kurdish citizens have an effective remedy against the State of
Iraq itself. In fact, there is such a procedure available. All of the
major undertakings and treaties referred to above - which are
165. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946); U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56; Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Charter of the Organization of American
States, opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948, art. 51, 2 U.S.T. 2394; American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2 1948, arts. I-IV, XVIIi, XXV-XXVI, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEAISer.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 73, arts. 146-47.
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binding upon the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iraq
- impose on the acceding states an express obligation to pro-
vide such recourse through their internal fora. Thus, there is not
only historical precedent for intervention and denial of immu-
nity to states which act as Iraq has done, but there are also am-
ple existing international treaties, conventions, agreements and
enabling provisions to which Iraq, the United States, the United
Kingdom and other allied nations are parties.
In the long term, the restriction of state immunity in cases
involving jus cogens violations, may be best served by exploring
the establishment, through the United Nations, of new interna-
tional tribunals attached to the ICJ where individuals have
standing to sue for civil and/or criminal claims they may have
against states. In the short term, however, in the absence of such
tribunals, it is necessary to explore how the immediate applica-
tion of the concept of universal jurisdiction might be applied by
Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims to the system of law in the United
States where the Genocide Convention has explicitly been incor-
porated into the statutory law of the land.
V. THE DENIAL OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS TO Jus Cogens: Vio-
LATIONS THROUGH THE GRANT OF JURISDICTION To PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS ESTABLISHED FOR THAT PURPOSE
The reputation for impartiality and the international credi-
bility of the ICJ is virtually undisputed. The limitation of the
ICJ to protect individual human rights is, of course, embodied in
its exclusive mandate to only undertake adjudication of disputes
between sovereign states. In spite of this limited mandate, the
ICJ regularly receives applications from individuals seeking re-
dress against states. For example, between April 1, 1988 and
July 31, 1989, some 1,200 such requests were received."' 6
The time has long since arrived for the United Nations to
place a new convention before the members of the General As-
sembly which would enable private individuals, non-governmen-
tal organizations, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, regional human rights commissions and other certified
entities to file complaints or raise petitions concerning criminal
or civil disputes or claims against sovereign states, individual of-
ficials or governmental agencies, departments or other entities.
166. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 163, at 67 n.13.
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While details would obviously have to be worked out, it is possi-
ble to envision the establishment of two new divisions of the ICJ
for this purpose: a Criminal Division to effectively try those
cases jurisdictionally defined as involving crimes under current
customary international or treaty law, and a Civil Division to
similarly entertain and hear cases involving purely civil disputes
which may not be properly raised in the relevant municipal fora.
The rules of jurisdiction, as well as all other procedures of
the new judge centered court, would be established by the tribu-
nal itself. A rotating panel of three ICJ Judges could sit as an
appellate court hearing on certiorari those appeals which two of
the three, at any time, believed had merit. Since this new con-
vention would effectively require signing states to pass any nec-
essary implementing municipal legislation, the judgments, or-
ders and rulings of the new court would be capable of being
ultimately enforced through the relevant state municipal sys-
tems. Those states which elected to withhold agreement to the
new convention would, of course, not be bound by proceedings
brought and heard in absentia against them, but it is anticipated
that such states would increasingly become pariahs in the eyes
of the rest of the world, which status would be exacerbated by
any ongoing unwillingness to appear and consent to jurisdiction.
Criminal complaints could take a form similar to private prose-
cutions in the United Kingdom (a procedure unknown in the
United States), whereby individual victims themselves, their
heirs, successors, assigns or a certified representative or organi-
zation on their behalf, may initiate and carry out a prosecution
on their behalf, with a tribunal empowered to adjudicate the
charges and, if sustained, to award them compensation.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the many
factors and issues which surround the proposal to establish such
"People's Courts." It is, however, timely, in light of the difficul-
ties existing under present international law and practice facing
the quest for justice by the victims of recent events in Kuwait
and Iraq, that such discussions begin at once and come quickly
to the floor of the General Assembly.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN CASES IN-
VOLVING Jus Cogens: VIOLATIONS By INDIVIDUAL STATES AND IN
PARTICULAR UNDER THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
The creation of new tribunals within the ICJ is clearly long
overdue and badly needed. In their absence, however, victims
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are left with only the possibility of recourse to municipal courts
when their human rights have been so violated that the acts
clearly constitute international crimes. In such cases, the munic-
ipal courts of acceding nations may accept jurisdiction of such
cases.
Historically, *the concept of codifying international crimes
and enforcement thereof has been associated with the movement
for the establishment of an international criminal court. The es-
tablishment of such a court, however, is clearly not essential. In
fact, the latest draft of the International Law Commission's
(ILC) Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (the Code) is based upon the premise that enforce-
ment would be carried out by municipal courts.
The usual basis of jurisdiction recognized in international
law over such offenses is the principle of universal jurisdiction.
It is jurisdiction to enforce sanctions on behalf of the interna-
tional community against the contemporary enemies of mankind
or the current hostis humani generis.1  Enforcement proceed-
ings against such abominable acts as those contravening the jus
cogens compel the application of the doctrine of universal juris-
diction. In light of current United States practice, it appears
most appropriate for the United States federal courts to lead the
way.
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (Restatement (Third)) explicitly sets a frame-
work for United States federal court jurisdiction in such cases.
Section 701 states the following:
A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons
subject to its jurisdiction
(a) that it has undertaken to respect by international
agreement;
(b) that states generally are bound to respect as a matter
of customary international law (§ 702); and
(c) that it is required to respect under general principles
of law common to the major legal systems of the world.
Section 702 lists the now generally recognized jus cogens norms
among the customary international law of human rights as
follows:
167. MYRES M. McDOUGAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE Ch. 12, § 5 (1991).
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A state violates international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights.
Section 703, in setting out remedies for violations of human
rights obligation states that ". . an individual victim of a viola-
tion of a human rights agreement may pursue any remedy pro-
vided by that agreement or by another applicable international
agreement." Section 711 holds a state responsible under interna-
tional law for any injury to a national of another state where the
injury is caused by an act or acts which violate a human right,
and it also reiterates the notion that the state's obligation runs
to all persons subject to its jurisdiction. In order for state liabil-
ity to exist for violation of customary international law for acts
or practices set out in Section 702, the abuse must be a matter
of state policy and the practice or practices must be officially
encouraged and condoned as to the state's own citizens and/or
aliens. 6 '
It is clear from the range of equipment and machinery left
behind by fleeing Iraqis that was used exclusively for the pur-
pose of torture, and the appearance and reports of victims inside
Iraq as well as Kuwait, that torture and assassination are prac-
tices officially sanctioned and routinely used by the Iraqi Gov-
ernment. Under Section 713, Iraq has state responsibility for the
injuries to and deaths of aliens resulting from violations of cus-
tomary international law or any applicable international agree-
ment, and the victims, as nationals of other states, pursuant to
Section 711, have rights to any remedy provided by: Section
713(2) (a) international agreement between the injuring state and
the state of nationality; 713(2)(b) the law of the injuring state;
and 713(2)(c) the law of any other state. An action in the courts
of the United States by Kuwaiti victims is thus possible under
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 101, § 702.
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Section 713(2)(c).
It is indisputable that Iraq has violated the jus cogens and
committed other violations of customary international law in
contravention of multilateral treaties and agreements to which it
has acceded and to which the United States has also acceded. It
is also historically established that nations of the world have at
various times intervened or taken jurisdiction to provide reme-
dies to victims of such abuse. Penal compensation, for instance,
was paid to victims of such violations of international law after
both world wars.
As previously shown, the principle of the Restatement
(Third) supports the exercise of United States court jurisdiction
in cases of human rights abuses in violation of international law.
Further, this concept has been upheld by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Filartiga case."" Similarly, the principle
of a sovereign state being liable for violations of the law of na-
tions and human rights abuses was confirmed in the Letelier
case, where a judgment was obtained after an assassination took
place on the streets of Washington, D.C.17 0
The argument here is that such jus cogens violations as
those committed by Iraq, which are prohibited practices set out
in Section 702 of the Restatement (Third), should be outside
any protection of state immunity. Also, act of state considera-
tions are in this analysis deemed to be inapplicable to such situ-
ations. Accordingly, the principle proposed is that such egre-
gious international crimes may never be immunized and that to
the extent that violators are protected, then international law is
proportionately diminished. This idea is neither original nor
new. Lord Wilberforce in addressing the fifty-eighth conference
of the International Law Association stated that sovereign im-
munity ". . . is a concept devised by lawyers in the 19th century
(and) is now being used by nations generally as a technique for
denying compliance with Uus cogens] obligations.' 7'
The Amerada Hess opinion, must be distinguished from
the Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims' cases in that it does not in-
volve any jus cogens violations or Restatement (Third) Section
169. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
170. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
171. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPRINT OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE
513, 515 (1980); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities
of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 221 (1951) [hereinafter Lauterpacht].
172. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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702 conduct or practices. Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA pro-
vides the basis for an exception to immunity as to Iraq in these
kinds of cases. The section sets out an exception to immunity in
those situations ". . . in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding
any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may pur-
port to effect, except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver."
Thus, if a state violates any of the fundamental norms em-
bodied in the concept of jus cogens from which states may not
derogate, then such state impliedly waives its immunity under
the FSIA. Jus cogens principles of law undeniably go to the very
essence of the public order of the international community and
have in the twentieth century, after two disastrous world wars,
come to be recognized as requiring absolute protection. The con-
cept is even applied to limit treaties so that a treaty concluded
in violation of a jus cogens norm is null and void.17 3 It must be
applied with even greater force to the unilateral acts of states
which do not have the authority of treaty status. Accordingly, it
is surely unwise to freeze in time any particular codification of
sovereign immunity law when the development of international
law itself is dynamic and constantly evolving. The FSIA, as with
other such state immunity statutes, must be able to incorporate
the developing standards in international law.
The days are long gone when one should even contemplate
the necessity of requiring a state to explicitly provide consent
and waive immunity for acts like genocide, and indiscriminate
torture, including rape, of civilians in occupied territory. There
is certainly no reasonable justification to expect that a state be-
ing accused of officially condoning and committing savage crimes
against innocent civilians, inside and outside of its territory, will
consent to be sued. The absurdity of the assertion of such a legal
requirement for jurisdiction boggles the mind in this day and
age, and brings the law into contempt. In the absence of any
international tribunals where subject matter and personal juris-
diction may be based, at least in respect to this particularly
small class of egregious jus cogens violations - acts which with-
out doubt are unanimously condemned by the people and their
governments throughout the world - the concept and practice
173. See Vienna Convention, supra note 144. See also Lauterpacht, supra note 171,
at 221.
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of universal jurisdiction must be applied.
Universal jurisdiction provides every state with jurisdiction
of a limited number of criminal acts and claims, regardless of
the situs of the offense and the nationalities of the offender and
victim. While other types of claims require direct connections
between the prosecuting state and the offense, the universality
principle attached to jus cogens violations compels each and
every state to have an interest in, and indeed a duty to, exercise
jurisdiction over such serious violations of law.
Indeed, for centuries, individuals acting in their public or
private capacities who committed such criminal acts have been
regarded as hostis humani generis and the universality principle
has long been applied to such persons. 17 4 Piracy, for instance, is
the oldest offense invoking universal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
over the offense originally evolved under customary interna-
tional law,575 and it was eventually given Treaty recognition in
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 17  Treaty signato-
ries have the right to assume jurisdiction over acts of piracy
even if they have no connection with the piracy. Nonparties may
assert universal jurisdiction over such acts under customary in-
ternational law.
The next notable instance in the application of the jus
cogens universality principle evolved with the trading of slaves,
which is now also clearly a crime subject to every state's jurisdic-
tion. States can recognize universal jurisdiction over slave trad-
ing by referring to customary international law, 17 7 the 1982 U.N.
174. Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 5 ISR. Y.B. H.R. 55, 55-68 (1975);
L.C. Green, International Crimes and the Legal Process, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 567,
568-70, 573-75 (1980); Clarence J. Mann, Personnel and Property of Transnational Bus-
iness Operations, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 399, 461 (Alona E.
Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978); Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War
Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1978); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821) (citing Grotius). See also Respublica
v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (1784) ("crime against the whole world"); 1
Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 515 (1821) (universal jurisdiction recognized in cases concerning
"crimes against the -human family"); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 464-65 (Jo-
seph Chitty ed., 1863) (recognizing violence against foreign ambassador as a "crime
against mankind" and an "offence against the law of nations").
175. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820); J.L. BRIERLY, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 311-14 (6th ed. 1963).
176. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 105, U.N. Al
CONF.62/122. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 19, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (en-
tered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
177. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEx. L. REv. 785, 798 (1988); M.C. Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda, Slavery and Slave Trade:
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Convention on the Law of the Sea'18 and the Conventions aimed
at abolishing the slave trade.1 9 As with piracy under customary
international law, a number of nineteenth century English inter-
national treaties developed a consensus that jurisdiction over
slave traders was permissible in the absence of any connection
between slave trading and the adjudicating state.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, universal juris-
diction was extended to several offenses other than piracy and
slave trading. The post-war trials focused on a range of war
crimes and crimes against humanity which then clearly became
part of the jus cogens. These cases were frequently premised
upon the universality principle, thereby extending the use of
universal jurisdiction since courts of one state frequently tried
and punished crimes committed outside of the state by foreign
nationals. 8 ' For instance, the State of Israel's prosecution of
Adolph Eichmann in 1961 and the recent trial of John
Demjanjuk for crimes they allegedly committed before Israel
was a state are clear examples of the exercise of universal juris-
diction for the adjudication of jus cogens violations. The Nu-
remberg, Tokyo and world wide affiliated trials discussed previ-
ously clearly extended the roster of crimes included under the
jus cogens universality principle; indeed, the very establishment
of the special tribunals themselves was based on a recognition of
this principle.
More recently, universal jurisdiction has been expanded to
cover other jus cogens violations involving terrorist acts and
human rights violations which have come to be condemned by
world opinion. This extension is reflective of the post-World
War II awareness and concern of the international community
and its unwillingness to further tolerate the types of egregious
criminal acts which shock the conscience of the civilized world.
Steps Toward Eradication, 12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 424 (1972); MAX SORENSON, MANUAL
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (1968).
178. See supra note 176.
179. See, e.g., Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926,
T.S. No. 778; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1953, 1 U.S.T. 479; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 3 U.S.T. 3201.
180. Willard B. Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AM. J. INT'L
L. 299 (1948); Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials - War Crimes and
International Law, 1949 INT'L CONCILIATION 241; Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 Am.
J. INT'L L. 257, 275-79 (1945); William Allen Zeck, Nuremberg: Proceedings Subsequent
to Goering et al., 26 N.C. L. REv. 350 (1948).
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Moreover, a range of post-war treaties and conventions, as well
as evolving customary international law, have been concerned
with the jurisdiction of states to adjudicate and prosecute such
crimes with which that state has no direct connection. Promi-
nently included in the list of treaties are the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949.181 Jus cogens violations under the Conventions
are designated as "grave breaches" and include offenses such as
torture, kidnapping, willful killing, biological experiments and
the willful cause of great suffering or serious injury to body or
health. Each party to the Geneva Conventions has legislative,
adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction over the commission
of these crimes, even if it has no connection with them and is
not engaged in the armed conflict or occupation in the course of
which the offense occurs.
In addition to and subsequent to the Genocide Convention
of 1948 and the Geneva Conventions, a number of particular
treaties and conventions have been signed which have the effect
of applying the universality principle to other crimes, including
the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, hostage taking, crimes
against internationally protected persons, the suppression and
punishment of apartheid, and the Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment.182 As noted, among others, by Professor Randall, the
181. The United States became a party to the Geneva Conventions on February 2,
1956. See generally Joyce Ada Cooke Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26
BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 294 (1949); Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva
Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393 (1952); Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field, August 12,
1949, art. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, at 1; Geneva Convention for the'Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August
12, 1949, art. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, at 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art 2, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, at 1; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 73, at art. 2.
182. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter
Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter Hague Con-
vention]. The United States became a party to the Hague Convention on September 14,
1971, and a party to the Montreal Convention, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 at 571, on February 28,
1973. A description of the Hague Convention, following the International Civil Aviation
Organization's approval of the treaty, is contained in 64 DEP'T ST. BULL. 50 (1971); Inter-
national Convention Against the Taking of Hostage, Dec. 17, 1979, reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1456 (1979), G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N., GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter Hostage Convention]. The United States is a party. The
Convention To Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
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universality principle underlies and runs through each of these
Conventions. 183 For example, the Hostage Convention states:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged of-
fender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its com-
petent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through pro-
ceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.1' 4
Consequently, though a number of these jus cogens violations
have been part of customary international law for varying peri-
ods of time and became explicitly incorporated into interna-
1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, [hereinafter OAS Convention], is a precursor to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatics Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, [hereinafter Internationally
Protected Persons Convention]. See Edward Mickolus, Multilateral Legal Efforts To
Combat Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis, 60HIo N.U. L. REv. 13, 27-29 (1979). The
OAS Convention provides that when extradition for a convention crime is not in order,
the requested "state is obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for prose-
cution, as if the act had been committed in its territory" OAS Convention, supra, art. 5.
The OAS Convention obliges the parties to prosecute only if extradition is not in order,
as compared to the type of jurisdictional provision that obliges the parties either to ex-
tradite or prosecute. The second convention, the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, art. 10, 18 I.L.M. 1422, 1427,
contains language that requires parties either to extradite or prosecute. Hence, this con-
vention, as implemented in Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
Implementation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
831, 1116 (1982)), may rely on the universality principle similar to the Hostage and In-
ternationally Protected Persons Conventions. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and An-
titerrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853, 896 (1986) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (1987), is noteworthy. The statute confers federal jurisdiction over extra-
territorial terrorist acts against United States nationals. In connection with this statute,
Senator Specter referred to universal crimes and the ability of any nation to prosecute
those who commit the crimes. 132 CONG. REc. S8435-38 (daily ed. June 25, 1986) (state-
ment of Sen. Spector). The Statute is exemplary of the proposition that universal juris-
diction today may evolve without deriving from an international agreement. Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973,
1015 U.N.T.S. 243, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3068 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974). The United States is not a
party; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Tor-
ture Convention]. This reprint of the Torture Convention is the draft form; minor revi-
sions are indicated in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). Inexplicably, the United States is not a party.
The offense may derive from crimes against humanity.
183. See supra note 177.
184. Hostage Convention, supra note 182, art. 8(1). For similar provisions see Tor-
ture Convention, supra note 182, art. 7(1); Internationally Protected Persons Conven-
tion, supra note 182, art. 7; Montreal Convention, supra note 182, at art 7; Hague Con-
vention, supra note 182, art. 7.
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tional criminal law after World War II, more recently a vast ar-
ray of conventions and protocols have been opened and ratified
by various states to formalize global concerns with such heinous
activity.
In addition, those jus cogens norms protected by the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights have also been included in re-
gional human rights declarations, conventions, protocols, resolu-
tions and municipal law statements such as the Restatement
(Third). Also, just as individuals and states have never been able
to derogate from responsibility in respect of adherence to this
compelling law, neither, it appears, does there exist any basis for
derogation by a "perpetual objector" individual or state which
has not signed a particular relevant Convention.
In his recently published work, Aspects of the Administra-
tion of International Justice, Elihu Lauterpacht specifically
notes the occurrence of what he terms ". . . an expansion of ju-
risdiction in the delicate area of compliance with human rights."
He refers to a ". . . relaxation of the standards of consent re-
quired to support an exercise of international jurisdiction,"' 85
citing as a particular example the manner in which the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) conducts its
proceedings of petitions on behalf of individuals filed against
members of the Regional Organization of American States
(OAS) which are not parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights (the American Convention). Though the Ameri-
can Convention is not binding upon four states at the present
time -Chile, Cuba, Paraguay and the United States - and thus
is not legally applicable to them, the IACHR has nonetheless ap-
plied to those nonparties the human rights provisions of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the
American Declaration).' The IACHR has conveyed normative
status upon the American Declaration as a result of its being
adopted as a resolution by the General Council of the OAS of
which Chile, Paraguay, Cuba and the United States are
members. 186
This practice is little known but is quite significant in light
of the common belief that the United States has consistently re-
fused to be subject to any binding obligations in respect of
human rights. In fact, the United States has accepted IACHR
185. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 163, at 30.
186. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 163, at 31.
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jurisdiction over a number of individual human rights petitions
filed against it alleging noncompliance with the standards set
out in the American Declaration. 1
87
Thus, in light of the tendency toward flexibility in accepting
universal jurisdiction because of the growing recognition of the
importance of human rights, the case for recognition and accept-
ance of fundamental overriding principles of international law
which are binding on all states is overwhelming. The least con-
troversial of the jus cogens class of laws are the laws of genocide
and crimes against humanity, the prohibition against piracy, the
trade in slaves, apartheid and racial or ethnic discrimination, ag-
gressive war, torture (which includes rape), hostage taking, sum-
mary murder or forced disappearance of individuals, aircraft hi-
jacking and sabotage, and crimes against internationally
protected persons. Hence, this relatively small number of funda-
mental norms is binding upon states in all circumstances, and
persons or governments which violate any of these norms are the
contemporary hostis humani generis. All states thus have not
only the right but also the obligation to prosecute these offenses.
As noted by dictum in the Barcelona Traction case:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obli-
gations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-A-vis another State .... By their
very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes. 188
Literally, then, the international obligations of upholding
and prosecuting violations of the jus cogens rules are obligations
erga omnes. They "flow to all" states, and just as states cannot
derogate responsibility for obeying this fundamental code of be-
havior, neither should they abrogate responsibility to prosecute
violating persons or other states.
As noted above, the ILC, following a directive of the Gen-
eral Assembly, has submitted a Code which identifies various
acts as "crimes under international law." The Code has not yet
been adopted by the General Assembly. In respect of state crim-
inal responsibility, which concerns us here, the ILC defines an
international crime - as contrasted with a delict or tort - as
187. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 163, at 31.
188. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. 4, 33 (Feb. 5).
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an act by a state which breaches an international obligation or
right deemed essential and fundamental by the world commu-
nity; i.e. the jus cogens. So, once again, it is clear that in the
absence of an appropriate international tribunal or a formally
adopted Code by the U.N. General Assembly, any prosecutions
must depend upon individual state actions and recourse to rele-
vant municipal and international laws and judicial fora.
In addition, while the concept of universal jurisdiction has
usually been applied to individuals, there is no sound reason
why it should not also apply to states whose criminal acts have
contravened the jus cogens norms. Article 2(7) of the Charter is
the most cited authority for the principle of nonintervention in
the domestic affairs and jurisdiction of sovereign states. The lan-
guage of 2(7) actually states that such ". . . matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . ."
shall not be subject to intervention. Jus cogens violations, re-
gardless of where they occur, are not only by their very nature
not "essentially within" the domestic jurisdiction of an offending
state, but compel the concern of every state and thus require the
application of universal jurisdiction and responsive action by or
on behalf of the international community.
It is compelling then, that in the face of such blatant con-
travention of jus cogens norms as in the Iraqi invasion and occu-
pation of Kuwait and the recurring genocidal attacks on the
Kurds, that obligations erga omnes exist. As such, they are im-
posed on the other states of the international community with
the obligation to act only possibly being fulfilled, in the absence
of an appropriate international tribunal, by one or another state
accepting universal jurisdiction over the claims. This would re-
sult in formal charges and claims being filed and sustained
against the State of Iraq, President Saddam Hussein, the mem-
bers of its Revolutionary Command Council, the General Intelli-
gence Department (the Mukhabarat), relevant members of the
Officer Corps and all others whose involvement in the commis-
sion of the crimes recorded may be legally established.
The state best equipped to lead the way - and no small
amount of fortitude, political and judicial will is required - is
the United States where, to a very large extent, the ground has
already been laid. In the Letelier case the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia emphatically and clearly
stated that no state has the ". . . discretion to commit or, to
have one's officers or agents commit, an illegal act. . . to perpe-
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trate conduct... contrary to the precepts of humanity as rec-
ognized in both national and international law . . ."I" More-
over, in Filartiga and Trajano the Court of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits, respectively, clearly confirmed that
28 U.S.C. § 1350 provided the legal basis and necessary statu-
tory authority for aliens to bring before the courts of the United
States those individuals, including their leaders, who have vio-
lated the jus cogens norms of international law. The Supreme
Court in The Paquete Habana recognized that federal courts
must ascertain and apply international law ". . . as often as
questions . . . depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination (and that customary international law must be
applied even in the absence of a treaty or other specific
legislation)."190
Iraq and its officials may also be viewed as clearly having
waived any conceivable shred of immunity as a result of its ac-
ceptance of the terms of ceasefire contained in Security Council
Resolution No. 687, which also requires Iraq's acceptance of the
terms of the previous Resolutions and in particular acceptance
of liability and the responsibility to compensate all those injured
and damaged by its acts.1"' In addition, its waiver of immunity
in respect of such offenses may be evidenced by its accession to
the extensive list of international treaties, agreements and con-
ventions discussed above, in which it has agreed to accept the
obligation to adhere to a wide range of human rights protections
and obligations.
Further, since the United States is also a party to a number
of the relevant treaties, agreements and conventions which bind
and require it to protect basic human rights, such as would be
violated by the conduct and practices set out in section 702 of
the Restatement (Third), the United States courts have ample
authority to entertain jurisdiction on behalf of appropriate alien
victims of crimes such as the Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims.
If the FSIA is applied, the problems of enforcing a judg-
ment, which frustrated the plaintiff/victims in Letelier, are very
real obstacles unless the courts interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1609 as
confirming that immunity of a foreign state from attachment
and execution (as in section 1604) does not apply when there
189. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
190. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798-99 (D. Kan. 1980).
191. SCOR Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
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exist - as here - international agreements in effect at the
time of enactment of the FSIA (1976) to which the United
States is a party. As discussed earlier, all of the previously dis-
cussed treaties and covenants are relevant, and the letter and
spirit of these international obligations do not envision enumer-
ating rights under international law without correlative responsi-
bilities and remedies being available in the event of their
contravention.
While the argument advanced in this article is that the
FSIA should not be applied in jus cogens violations cases, even
if the FSIA is applied, to the extent that the Kuwaiti and Kurd-
ish victims may bring an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 against
the State of Iraq and immunity does not attach, then it is only a
fair reading of the enforcement provisions in such cases that im-
munity should not be allowed to frustrate a judgment obtained
by protecting property and assets of the very state in respect of
which immunity is restricted. Since, however, the compelling
logic is that the FSIA should never be applicable in such cases,
this consideration would not have to be raised.
Aside from the FSIA, Iraq should clearly not be allowed to
assert the act of state doctrine. Acts and practices complained of
by the Kuwaiti and Kurdish victims can in no way be regarded
as typical acts of state. Such a typical act of state may be the
condemnation of land or the expropriation of property by a state
within its own territory. Jus cogens violations should never
again be cloaked with the political protection of state immunity,
in any guise. The Restatement (Third) also clearly provides that
claims arising from such acts and practices cannot be absolved
by invoking the act of state doctrine.
VII. OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY TO IRAQ BY UNITED STATES COURTS
A. Recovery - A Right Without A Remedy
As we have seen, even if a foreign sovereign or state is de-
nied jurisdictional immunity under the FSIA, there are severe
restrictions imposed upon a judgment creditor's execution or en-
forcement against state assets. Though both commercial and
tort claims may give rise to jurisdiction, presently only commer-
cial creditors may execute on their judgments.
Successful plaintiffs in cases such as those under discussion
here, would, in my view, have to obtain recovery through: one,
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the introduction of a private bill granting a particular exception
in these cases; or two, conversion of the United States judgment
in a foreign state, such as the Federal Republic of Germany,
where municipal law would allow enforcement against the state's
assets in that jurisdiction. If, however, as argued above (see VI),
United States courts (having to date never ruled on the issue)
finally sustain subject matter jurisdiction holding that in respect
of jus cogens violations state immunity can never attach, then
the problem would not arise.
B. Increase in Litigation
A frequently heard argument is that should the United
States federal courts become the "world's courts" for such
human rights claims, then the result would be a vast increase in
litigation which would provide additional stress to an already
over-burdened system. The suggestion here is that it is more
likely that the United States courts would provide an example
for other municipal fora to follow and certainly not carry out
this task by itself any more than it should seek to be the world's
policeman. At this point in time, it is simply constitutionally
and legally able to provide leadership. It must be stressed, in
any event, that there is a built in limitation 6n the number of
cases that could be brought since the class of offenses which may
contravene the jus cogens is quite small. Since jus cogens repre-
sents only universal and peremptory norms of international law,
only the most egregious violations would qualify for considera-
tion by the courts.
C. Domestic Legal Doctrines and Procedural Practices as
Barriers
Having disposed of the act of state doctrine, perhaps the
two most significant domestic doctrinal or procedural barriers to
such claims being heard are the discretionary doctrine of forum
non conveniens and the need for the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
1. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine is discretionary with the court and is based on
convenience to the parties in such a way that even if a district
court has jurisdiction, it may refuse to hear a case if the action
could be brought in a more appropriate forum. Relevant factors
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include the cost of producing witnesses, the source of governing
law, injustice to the parties and the location of evidence.
Dismissal under the doctrine is not permitted if there is no
other forum in which the action may be brought, where the al-
ternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter
in dispute"9 2 or where impartiality of the foreign forum is not
present. 9" In the instance of the Kuwaiti/Kurdish claims, this
would clearly appear to be the case; the true alternative fora
would be Kuwait - where under municipal law the bar of abso-
lute state immunity exists - and Iraq where not only is this also
the case, but it is evident that no impartial proceedings could be
held under current circumstances.
2. Jurisdiction
Under both 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the FSIA, where subject
matter jurisdiction exists, personal jurisdiction is conveyed sub-
ject to proper service of process and fulfillment of the require-
ments of due process. In Texas Trading and Milling Corp." it
was held and affirmed that the due process clause was applicable
to a foreign state. Consequently, a court must determine
whether minimum contacts exist between the defendant state
and the forum sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.11
Two types of personal jurisdiction have been recognized by
the Supreme Court. If the claim is related to or arising out of a
defendant's contacts with the forum, then specific jurisdiction
exists. If the contacts are not connected with or so related then
the court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction but may have gen-
eral jurisdiction, which requires systematic, continuing contacts
with the forum of a more material nature than those conveying
specific jurisdiction.' 9
In the instance of the Kuwaiti and Kurdish claims there
would appear to be no reason why an appropriate federal district
court may not exercise general jurisdiction over Iraq. Not only is
192. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981), reh'g denied, 455
U.S. 928 (1982).
193. Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, 78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 842 F.2d
1466 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
194. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
195. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
196. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining, 342 U.S. 437 (1952), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952).
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there no constitutional bar to such jurisdiction, 197 but the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, with certiorari denied by the Supreme
Court, has stated that such jurisdiction could be sustained
against the Republic of Mexico based on that state's substantial,
continuous, and systematic contacts with the United States,
even though said contacts were not related to the specific cause
of action.198 Iraq's ongoing activities in the United States, its en-
tering into a number of bilateral treaties with the United States
and its previous use of the United States courts for unrelated
disputes provide sufficient contacts to satisfy due process199 as
well as the requirements of fair play and substantial justice.200
Accordingly, on the basis of obstacles or objections based
upon the requirements of law and practice, there is no sound
reason to bar such claims as concern us here. Only political in-
tervention, the death knell of an independent judiciary, can de-
feat the compelling exercise of jurisdiction by the appropriate
federal district courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As discussed previously, there are adequate provisions in
the substantive municipal laws of Kuwait (with some reserva-
tion), the United Kingdom and the United States, whereby
causes of action exist for the acts and practices which resulted in
the massive injury and deaths of innocent Kuwaiti and Kurdish
victims of Iraq's aggression. It is also clear that the current mu-
nicipal judicial posture in applying the relevant foreign state im-
munity statutes of all the three countries is discouraging in en-
tertaining jurisdiction for actions against Iraq. Additionally, it is
settled that the acts complained of constitute international
crimes since these acts violate the jus cogens norms of custom-
ary international law and contravene a number of treaties ac-
ceded to by Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The varying status and relationship of relevant interna-
tional laws and treaties to municipal law in Kuwait, the United
197. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
198. Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 917 (1984).
199. See, e.g., Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. -599 (N.D. Cal.), afl'd,
817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); Rush-Presbyterian - St.
Luke's Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 690 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ill. 1988) aff'd, 877
F.2d 574 (7th Cir.); cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989).
200. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Kingdom, and the United States has also been discussed. In fo-
cusing on the latter in this article, it is evident that such inter-
national law and obligations form part of the municipal law of
the United States with jurisdiction entertained under the doc-
trine of universal jurisdiction. In this context, the application of
state immunity in instances of fundamental human rights
abuses and international war crimes clearly indicates that such
protection has historically evolved to become not only restricted,
but inapplicable.
It is also clear that acts such as those committed in Kuwait
and later in Iraq itself may be imputed to sovereign states which
then must bear responsibility and liability. Additionally, the
availability of a remedy for the victims and their families is a
necessary correlative right to each cause of action, without which
the law will lose credibility.
Finally, principles gleaned from the foregoing and applied
to the laws of the United States, in particular to section 1350
and the FSIA, confront any Kuwaiti or Kurdish victim seeking
to bring an action against the Government of Iraq in the United
States courts.
Applicable causes of action under United States law clearly
exist but the victims must distinguish jus cogens violations from
standard torts in an action against a sovereign state. In the
Kuwaiti/Kurdish/Iraqi context, this is not very difficult.
Prosecution against the State of Iraq and its previously
mentioned officials is possible even under the FSIA: one, by at-
tributing a waiver of immunity to Iraq in light of the acceptance
of liability2 °' and because of its violation of internationally ac-
cepted criminal acts in which it has agreed it will not engage;
two, by interpreting the FSIA as being subject to the prohibition
of those acts by the previous multilateral treaties of the Charter,
the Universal Declaration, the Hague IV, and the Fourth Ge-
neva, acceded to by both the United States and Iraq, with the
result that such adjudication and enforcement is outside the
FSIA protection; or three, as the preferred course, by breaking
new ground and holding - in accord with, for example, the
State Immunity Statute of the Federal Republic of Germany -
that international law and the laws of the United States require
that state immunity may not be applied in cases involving inter-
national crimes so egregious to be classified as part of the jus
201. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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cogens.
The act of state doctrine is clearly inapplicable in such cases
and, with the ruling in the Trajano case, though particular in
scope, a foundation has been laid for these types of cases to be
brought before the courts of the United States.
No justification exists for considering the protection of a
state by use of the political question doctrine any more than it
does for sovereign immunity to state acts of the type discussed
here. No sovereign state should be immune on grounds of politi-
cal considerations from civil and criminal prosecution for the
types of crimes committed against the Kuwaiti or Kurdish vic-
tims. Each state has an obligation to amplify the cries for justice
uttered by those who have been maimed, tortured, brutally in-
jured and killed by such systematic processes officially sanc-
tioned as policy by a sovereign state. In the absence of an inter-
national tribunal, civilized nations must accept the obligation to
provide, erga omnes, their municipal fora for such proceedings
to take place.
It may be true that the criteria of impartiality would be bet-
ter satisfied if the proceedings could be held before an estab-
lished international tribunal, as discussed above, or in a more
politically neutral country like Ireland or Holland. If the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction could be entertained in such a
place, this might be explored. If not, in an imperfect world,
rather than not going forward at all, the federal courts of the
United States should at this time entertain jurisdiction and hear
these cases. The alternative and easiest path is to do nothing,
but this would produce a totally unacceptable result and
heighten the contempt for the rule of law and legal systems
everywhere. -
This article therefore proposes that victims or their legal
representatives should begin to file complaints in the district
courts of the United States under section 1350 (28 U.S.C. §
1350, the Alien Torts Statute), on behalf of those eligible
Kuwaiti and/or Kurdish victims. This is the first necessary step
to ensure that justice is not only seen to be done, but in fact is
done, on behalf of victims, many of whose interests will inevita-
bly be unmet by the U.N. Compensation Commission.
Such a commitment by the United States to the rule of law
in the world will set a precedent that will certainly, from time to
time, be uncomfortable to its political and economic interests. It
may even result in its being embarrassed or humbled on occa-
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sion and will inevitably require the restraint of interventionary
activity on the part of the world's most powerful nation. In the
long term, however, surely the enhancement of the processes of
law which require the nonviolent resolution of disputes and the
protection of universally agreed fundamental rights - the hal-
lowed jus cogens norms - will more likely produce the much
articulated desire for peace and security.
Now it is time to clearly affirm and demonstrate that no
sovereign state and no government official of even the highest
rank is above the agreed fundamental norms of customary inter-
national law; this article shows that the jus cogens is firstly and
indisputably embodied in customary international law as well as
in a piethora of treaties, covenants, conventions and related pro-
tocols and agreements. It must emerge that states are subject to
and not above the internationally accepted rules of law and are
liable for appropriate sanctions and penalties if they are contra-
vened. The tragic, cataclysmic events of the Persian Gulf War
have provided us with the most significant possibility since the
Second World War to affirm the rule of law and the inviolability
of the basic rights of each individual member of the global
community.
Perhaps, as never before, we have confronting us, as a result
of massive human suffering, misery and death, an opportunity to
create enduring international legal precedents and structures
that will guarantee the principle that those basic rights of indi-
vidual human beings are at least as sacred as the sovereignty of
states. As always, pressures abound for this opportunity to be
missed. This must not be allowed.
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